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AN ANALYSIS OF THE FOREIGN MILITARY SALES PIPELINE OF REPAIR AND REPLACE REPARABLE ASSETS

THESIS

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AFIT/GLM/LSM/92S-34

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# AN ANALYSIS OF THE FOREIGN MILITARY SALES PIPELINE OF REPAIR AND REPLACE REPARABLE ASSETS

#### THESIS

Presented to the Faculty of the School of Systems and Logistics of the Air Force Institute of Technology

Air University

In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Science in Logistics Management

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September 1992

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

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Larry Orlando and George Rhame

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#### <u>Abstract</u>

This study examined the reparable logistics pipeline and identified characteristics and associated problems with the processing of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) repair and replace aircraft assets. Areas of investigation included examining the FMS logistics reparable pipeline and determining what section of the pipeline the USAF controls or can influence, identifying the individual problems within that section of pipeline, and collecting and analyzing data pertaining to FMS repair and replace requisitions. The methodology used in these areas, respectively, involved a literature review, personal interviews with Foreign Liaison Officers to obtain customer perspectives, and a statistical analysis of pipeline times for all FMS replacement requisitions for F-16 reparables filled within a specific six month period. Of primary concern to both the USAF and the customers was the time it took to fill replacement requisitions and especially the problems associated with Hcoding requisitions. The research showed numerous possible causes for delays and indicated that many of the problems start before the USAF is even aware of the customer's demand, but that the USAF has been working hard to correct problems within its control and has attempted to improve the process overall.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE FOREIGN MILITARY SALES
PIPELINE OF REPAIR AND REPLACE REPARABLE ASSETS

#### I. Introduction

#### General Issue

The United States is one of several nations which sell arms to foreign countries. This transfer or exchange of weapon systems to ally nations represents a significant portion of our nation's defense industrial base as well as having strong political overtones. Consequently, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) plays a vital role in providing logistical and technical support to these Foreign Military Sales (FMS) customers. The level of support provided by the USAF contributes to the political and economic success of each of these security assistance programs, which in turn affects our national security as a whole.

But the process of providing logistics support can be a slow one. Experience has indicated that FMS reparable assets may not be processed efficiently, taking an excessive amount of time to return serviceable assets to the customer's supply system. Furthermore, there is concern that many of the assets turned into the USAF repair cycle may be held for extended periods of time, in some cases longer than one year.

In an April 1991 letter to the Air Logistics Center (ALC) commanders, General Charles C. McDonald, Commander of the Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC), reminded each center commander of the substantial increase in support they have provided to our allies through FMS in recent years. General McDonald's letter went on to say that despite the increased support needs:

. . . not all of our [USAF] policies and processes have kept pace, especially with respect to FMS repair. This has resulted in an increasing FMS repair backlog and dissatisfied customers. We must change our focus from top to bottom and commit to eliminating the FMS repair backlog, satisfying our FMS customers and using our capacity to best advantage. FMS FY90 case values were \$26 billion and have the potential to continue to grow as our force structure decreases. Our first target in instituting this change in focus is to clear the FMS repair backlog (17).

This letter resulted in a heightened interest in FMS throughout the command and is considered by many to be the genesis of the current focus on improving logistical support.

#### Problem Statement

Since the USAF has only limited introl over the FMS reparable pipeline, the specific research problem for this thesis was to examine the reparable logistics pipeline and identify characteristics and associated problems with the processing of FMS repair and replace aircraft assets. The research objectives were as follows: (1) examine the FMS logistics reparable pipeline and determine what section of

the pipeline the USAF controls or can influence, (2) identify the individual problems within that section of pipeline, (3) determine what policy changes were put forth by USAF to address the problems, and (4) collect and analyze data pertaining to FMS repair and replace requisitions.

#### Research Questions

In consideration of the previously mentioned objectives, the following research questions were addressed:

- 1. At what point do FMS reparables fall under USAF control or influence in the pipeline?
- 2. What are the customer's views of the USAF reparable pipeline and what do they perceive to be the biggest problems?
- 3. What repair and replace program policy issues have been addressed as a result of the current heightened interest in FMS logistical support?
- 4. What can an FMS customer typically expect in terms of response times for the replacement requisition process?

#### Scope

To the maximum extent possible, this study focused on FMS aircraft assets returned to USAF ALCs for organic "repair and replace" type restoration. Repair and replace programs allow FMS customers to return unserviceable items to the repair activity and, if determined to be economically reparable, get replacement items issued from USAF stocks. The customer's unserviceable items are repaired and returned

to USAF stocks. The country is then charged appropriately depending on the type of FMS case it is (7:353). Although much of the FMS reparable pipeline may also apply to "repair and return," this study did not specifically address those assets nor those repaired under contractual arrangements such as nonstandard item parts and repair support (NIPARS).

#### <u>Definitions</u> of Terms

A glossary of terms used in this thesis may be found in Appendix A. Unless otherwise noted, all definitions were taken from the FMS Glossary of Terms prepared by the AFLC International Logistics Center (ILC) policy branch, AFLC-ILC/XMXB (1).

#### Overview of Thesis

This first chapter introduced the general issue that there are concerns associated with the FMS reparable pipeline. A specific problem statement, research questions, scope of the research and definition of terms were also addressed.

The remainder of this thesis consists of a review of literature in chapter two, a methodology explanation and description in chapter three, a report on our research findings in chapter four, and an analysis of those findings with our conclusions and recommendations in chapter five.

#### II. Literature Review

#### Chapter Overview

The purpose of this chapter is to present information obtained through a search of the literature pertaining to Foreign Military Sales (FMS), support of reparable assets, the USAF-controlled section of the pipeline through which FMS reparables travel, and associated problems that foreign customers have with the reparable pipeline.

A literature search, or review, is an exploratory study of books, periodicals, and other writings used to familiarize researchers with their particular area of interest. Literature reviews help avoid the inefficiencies of discovering anew through original research what has been done by others already (12:145). A literature review was the primary method of determining what section of the reparable pipeline actually falls under USAF control.

#### Foreign Military Sales

There are two methods of conducting U.S. arms export sales, both designed to enhance the mutual security of the United States and friendly foreign nations. One acquisition method available to foreign countries is that of direct commercial sale. Direct commercial sales enable foreign governments, with U.S. government approval, to deal directly with a U.S. contractor in obtaining weapon systems. The

other acquisition approach open to foreign governments is through Foreign Military Sales.

When purchasing countries select FMS, the Department of Defense (DOD) works as a middleman, basically serving as an executive agent for the foreign customer in negotiating contractual agreements with U.S. companies, integrating various system support activities, and providing essential administrative services. The buyer/seller relationship is defined by a DD Form 1513, the Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA), which is prepared by the Department of Defense. The LOA offers foreign governments or international organizations defense articles and services pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and projects the costs of the equipment, services, and authorized DOD charges (1:29). These extra charges are to cover the DOD's ·cost of doing business on behalf of the purchaser, that is, for such activities as material handling, contract administration, administrative overhead, logistics support, and non-recurring research and development (5:1-13).

FMS offers both initial support packages and follow-on support cases. Initial support packages provide support needed for the foreign customer to establish an in-country operational capability during the initial operating phase. This support is a consideration of FMS's "total package approach" and is provided either before or at the same time the system or major item is delivered (7:342).

Follow-on support cases begin with the initial operation of the system and include the material and services required for the operation of the system and equipment during its service life. Unlike initial support, follow-on support is not provided as a package but rather as individual cases for spares, support equipment, technical assistance, and so on. There are three types of support cases: defined order cases written for specific items and quantities with material normally leadtime away; blanket order cases written for a dollar value, which allows customers to requisition up to the dollar value of the case, again with material normally leadtime away; and, finally, cooperative logistics supply support arrangements (CLSSAs), which give participating countries a method to become a partner in the USAF and Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) supply systems for the purpose of reducing requisition leadtimes (2:1.1).

It was in this area of logistics support that we were primarily concerned and, in particular, how the U.S. Air Force fulfilled the DOD's responsibility under FMS agreements with the customer to provide that support related to reparable aircraft parts or components.

#### Reparable Support

AFLC (combined with the Air Force Systems Command in June 1992 becoming the Air Force Materiel Command as a result of USAF-wide restructuring) provides support to

military forces around the world. "Each year, AFLC depot maintenance organizations overhaul or modify more than 1,200 aircraft and 6,400 aircraft engines or major engine components. In addition, over 1.1 million reparable assemblies. . .are overhauled or repaired" (8:8). Reparables are items that are not consumed in use, that is, they can be reconditioned or economically repaired when they become unserviceable. FMS provides foreign countries with a means of obtaining repair services without the necessity of establishing an in-country capability. In-country repair programs are not economically feasible in many cases, especially if the number of aircraft to be maintained and serviced is relatively small. However, a foreign customer with in-country repair capability may still want the FMS program to supplement its own. Most reparables sent back to the U.S. by FMS customers are for depot level repairs, overhauls, or rebuilds beyond the local capability of the foreign country. These repairs are accomplished through either "repair and replace" programs or through "repair and return" programs (15:80).

Repair and replace, simply put, is a process that results in replacement parts being issued from inventory whenever a broken part is turned in for repair. When the broken part enters the repair cycle it is sent back to the U.S. for repair in exchange for a serviceable part pulled from the U.S. government inventory. FMS customers with eligible CLSSAs, or blanket order cases, can use the repair

and replace program (15:80). An advantage of the repair and replace method is that the customer does not need to wait for the repair cycle to run its course in order to receive a serviceable part. The FMS customer pays an average cost for repairing the broken part. For non-CLSSA cases, customers are charged replacement costs of the item issued from U.S. inventories (7:353). The replacement cost is the ALC current catalog price which is based on the assumed return of a reparable carcass.

On the other hand, repair and return programs enable FMS customers to send broken parts back to the U.S. for repair. Asset serial numbers are recorded in order to return the original asset to the country after repairs have been completed. The country is then billed for the actual repair costs (15:81).

#### Priority System

A major factor which determines how long it takes items to travel through the logistics pipeline is the degree of urgency associated with the requirement for the asset. The Uniform Material Movement and Issue Priority System (UMMIPS) helps satisfy the need to identify the relative importance of competing demands for resources within the logistics system. Furthermore, UMMIPS provides guidance for the ranking of material requirements as well as incremental time standards for requisition processing and material movement.

A series of two-digit numeric codes known as priority designators are used to assign their ranking of relative importance. The priority designator is determined by a combination of factors that relate to the mission of the requisitioning activity and the urgency of need. These factors are called the Force/Activity Designator (FAD) and the Urgency of Need Designator (UND), respectively. The FAD is represented by a Roman numeral from I through V and is assigned by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff for all FMS customer countries. Usually, each customer has a FAD that is applicable to all requisitions for material destined for their country. However, different FADs may be assigned to a particular FMS case. Alphabetic characters A, B, or C are used to indicate the UND which is determined by the customer using the criteria established by UMMIPS directives. Basically, UND "A" means the customer has an extremely urgent requirement for the needed item in order to perform its mission. UND "B" is used to show that the mission of the force/activity is impaired, but not stopped. Finally, UND "C" indicates a routine requirement such as stock replenishment.

Table 1 provides an example of the UMMIPS matrix which is used to determine the priority designators for a given requisition. For example, an FMS customer assigned a FAD of "V" with a UND "C" would have a priority of 15 assigned to the requisition (7:335).

TABLE 1.

UMMIPS PRIORITY MATRIX (9:24.20)

	Urgency of Need Designator			
Force/Activity	Α	В	С	
Force/Activity Designators	Requisition Priority Designator			
I	01	04	11	
II	02	05	12	
III	03	06	13	
IV	07	09	14	
٧	08	10	15	

#### The Logistics Pipeline

Although the pipeline which carries FMS reparables actually starts and ends at the foreign customer's flightline, the U.S. Air Force influences the first part of the pipeline by dictating to the customer what shipping procedures must be followed when returning carcasses to ALCs for repair. Furthermore, the USAF can only control the section of that pipeline from where the asset enters the DOD distribution channels or arrives at the appropriate location for either depot maintenance or to be shipped on to a repair contractor, until the repaired item or a replacement is shipped back to the customer. This is illustrated in figure 1.




Figure 1. Pipeline Areas of USAF Responsibility

Depot Subsystem. The following description of the depot subsystem of the logistics pipeline does not reflect changes that were currently being brought about by the aforementioned USAF organizational restructuring, but is based upon an outline of the general ALC organizations and their responsibilities provided in a 1989 thesis by Bond and Ruth. In fact, responsibilities were shifted in some cases not only to different directorates but also to different agencies, such as the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) now owns the distribution function. However, the outline by Bond and Ruth is sufficient for our needs here to understand the movement of assets internal to the Air Logistics Centers.

TABLE 2.
USAF AIR LOGISTICS CENTERS (10:14.71)

Center	Abbreviation	n Location
Ogden	00	Hill AFB, UT
Oklahoma City	OC	Tinker AFB, OK
Sacramento	SM	McClellen AFB, CA
San Antonio	SA	Kelly AFB, TX
Warner Robins	WR	Robins AFB, GA

The USAF depot subsystem of the logistics pipeline is managed by five separate depot organizations called Air Logistics Centers (ALCs) which are identified in table 2. The ALCs are divided into directorates which are responsible for distribution, maintenance, procurement, and material

management, with each ALC providing similar overall functions (3:93).

When reparable items arrive at an ALC, they enter the depot subsystem of the pipeline where they are received by the Directorate of Distribution (DS). DS consists of five divisions: two that handle storage and issue functions and two that provide distribution management functions (these four divisions make up Depot Supply); and one division responsible for Depot Transportation (3:93).

After receiving a reparable item, DS processes and transports it to the Depot Maintenance section of the depot pipeline which is managed by the Directorate of Maintenance (MA). Depot Maintenance accounts for a large percentage of both the total assets held within the pipeline and actual pipeline time. The item is actually held by the DS Material Processing Division until requested by MA. Upon MA's request, the item moves from Depot Supply into the Maintenance Inventory Center (MIC) to be held until requested by the appropriate production shop for repair. Repaired items are later routed back through the MIC to be turned in to Depot Supply (3:98).

For the purposes of this thesis, this answered the first research question—the section of the pipeline controlled by the USAF is from the point assets arrive at an ALC for repair until the point where the customer's requisition is filled and shipped from the ALC. Also of interest was where the USAF influenced the pipeline;

therefore, since shipping procedures are dictated by USAF regulations, the shipment of unserviceable assets from the customer to the appropriate ALC was considered to be a part of the influenced pipeline. A full description of these shipment procedures is in AFM 67-1, volume IX, chapter 14, paragraph five.

#### Customer Concerns Toward FMS

Under the repair and replace program, part carcasses enter the repair cycle while replacements are issued out of the spares pool. The issuing of spares is determined by the Uniform Material Movement and Issue Priority System (UMMIPS), a priority system developed by DOD to establish the relative importance of competing requisitions. Priorities are based upon the importance of the mission of the requisitioning activity, as determined by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the urgency of need designator (9). A foreign country that has sent a part back to the U.S. for repair then loses that part if demand exceeds supply and other requisitions have higher priority. This can happen because the carcass reverts back to being USAF property upon its receipt at the ALC while the customer's requisition continues on as a separate entity. For instance, a USAF requisition might be filled with an FMS customer's part if no other items are available. To compound the problem for the FMS customer, U.S. defense budgets are forcing reductions in the number of spare parts (18:26). Customers

feel that UMMIPS allows the USAF to usurp what could fairly be called foreign assets in order to fulfill U.S. requirements. But, from the U.S. point of view, the logistics system is performing an important function by allocating spares based on identified priorities (15:82).

A major problem with the repair and return process is unsatisfactory response times. Items requiring nonorganic (contractor) repair can take a year or more before being returned to the foreign customer. According to an interview Paul Lyons had with a General Dynamics repair manager, a May 1991 audit of General Dynamics was conducted to determine how long items stayed in holding areas awaiting actions to resolve repair problems. The audit, limited to F-16 repair actions for Egypt and Israel, found that 76 percent of the parts had been in a holding area for more than 50 days while 11 percent had been there between 400-500 days. The audit further revealed that much of the problem was due to production managers at Ogden ALC not being notified by the FMS customer that parts had been shipped to General Dynamics for repair. Since the contractor requires repair authorization from the ALC production manager, parts would sit in holding areas until General Dynamics identified them and contacted Ogden. The audit also identified contractual problems which were found to delay the process even more (15:84-85).

In his Air Force Institute of Technology Master's thesis entitled "An Evaluation of Logistics Support For F-16

Aircraft Owned by Foreign Countries," Lyons says that "timely, efficient logistics support of FMS customers of F-16 aircraft does not appear to be a principal concern of the USAF logistics system. Complexity of processes, untimely responses, and failure to consider customer needs are common failings on the part of the USAF" (15:90).

#### Conclusion

The U.S. Air Force is challenged to improve the repair backlog of its FMS customers. As drawdowns in the U.S. military take place and America relies more and more on the ability of its allies to protect themselves, it becomes critical that it provide FMS customers with the support pledged to them.

In summary, this literature review introduced and described Foreign Military Sales, reparable support, the logistics pipeline, and problems and customer concerns associated with the movement of FMS assets through the pipeline. The literature has shown that there are problems with returning reparable assets to our FMS customers in a timely manner. Senior Air Force leadership, aware of the important role played by foreign military sales, has initiated actions to help reduce the reparable backlog. However, this is only the start and much effort is needed to first identify the problem areas within the FMS pipeline and then work to resolve them.

#### III. Methodology

#### Chapter Overview

In this chapter, the research methodology will be addressed and a brief explanation of the three main areas of investigation is offered. The methods to be reviewed are literature search, judgment sampling, and personal interviewing. Last, a description of the population and sample is also provided.

#### Explanation

In order to perform a relatively thorough investigation of the repair and replace pipeline and identify characteristics and problems associated with it in the time available to us, we felt that our research needed to be both qualitative and quantitative in nature. To achieve the qualitative side of the research, we gathered information by reviewing literature, such as regulations, related to the subject and also by discussing the repair and replace program with people who work with it regularly. Quantitative analysis was done by collecting data related to general pipeline times, such as now long it took for the USAF to receive a customer's reparable carcass and the time it took to ship that customer a serviceable spare. Such a qualitative and quantitative approach had to be limited considering the time constraints we had to meet and so we decided that the research would include three main areas of

investigation: (1) examining the USAF-controlled and influenced section of the reparable pipeline, (2) collecting data on common reparable parts, and (3) interviewing FMS customers (liaison officers). Corresponding to these areas were three different research methods: a literature search, nonprobability sampling, and personal interviews.

Identifying the section of the reparable pipeline that falls under USAF control was the first order of business because we wanted to know exactly what the USAF is responsible for before analyzing the pipeline to collect data on reparables or interviewing the liaison officers. This area of research included discussions with USAF logistics personnel to determine the recent history of USAF logistics pipelines and a review of current regulations related to this topic. Individual steps were explored and examined in the repair and replace requisition process for further insight.

#### Description of Population and Sample

A population, according to Emory and Cooper, "is the total collection of elements about which we wish to make some inferences" (12:242). For the purpose of this research, the population will be all FMS reparables controlled by USAF ALCs under a repair and replace program. The sample for this study consisted of a selection of F-16 reparable assets that shipped from the ALCs within a six-month period. Any inferences from the sample to the

population can be supported only by logic. For example, the conclusions we came to based upon our research of F-16 requisitions may not necessarily hold true for FMS customers requisitioning F-4 parts. There are numerous differences between the two systems and so it should be expected that inferences made about the F-4, based on our F-16 research, must be logically reasoned out.

<u>Data Collection</u>. Probability sampling refers to the random selection of elements to reduce or eliminate sampling bias by assuring that each population element is given a known nonzero chance of selection (12:244). In contrast, nonprobability sampling is nonrandom. However, although it is considered to be technically inferior to probability sampling because of the increased opportunity for bias to enter into the sample selection and possibly distort the research findings, nonprobability sampling is still a practical alternative method of sampling. Practical considerations such as time requirements were the reason for selecting nonprobability sampling. The particular type of nonprobability sampling that was used to collect data on common reparable parts is called judgment sampling. Judgment sampling, a type of purposive sampling, occurs when sample members are handpicked to conform to some criteria (12:275).

By collecting data on common reparables, we were able to determine such information as average times spent in various phases of the pipeline and the variability the

customer could expect in each of those phases. The first thing to do was to identify a common weapon system. F-16 was chosen because it is a relatively young and popular weapon system acquired through FMS with fifteen foreign countries carrying them in their aircraft inventories as of 1991 (19). In this regard, we considered the F-16 to be a good aircraft to focus on to gather a sample of repair and replace requisitions, managed by Ogden ALC, within the population of all FMS reparable requisitions controlled by all USAF ALCs under a repair and replace program. Another reason the F-16 was selected was because of the availability of data associated with a popular weapon system and the convenience it afforded us when we needed to collect the sample of requisitions. To further narrow the sample and make it a more manageable size, we decided to collect data only on requisitions that shipped from ALCs within a sixmonth period (19 December 1991 through 19 June 1992).

The Security Assistance Management Information System (SAMIS) was used to collect the data. SAMIS is the computer system used for FMS management and requisition routing and control. A standard request for comprehensive requisition data was submitted at the International Logistics Center (ILC) SAMIS office. A specific material management aggregation code (MMAC) was used to identify F-16 requisitions only. The MMAC further served to identify requisitions of parts common to the USAF inventory. Data collected from the resulting SAMIS product included

nomenclature, the original document number provided by the customer, the requisition number, status history, shipping dates from the ALCs, and information pertaining to whether the requisition was programmed or non-programmed.

Pipeline times calculated by taking the differences of the julian dates in the customer document numbers, the Hcoded requisition number, and from the processing dates listed in the status history. The original customer document number date was used to approximate the time when the demand was initiated by the customer. By taking the difference between that document number julian date and the date the requisition was H-coded we could approximate how long it took the unserviceable part to get from the customer to the ALC. This was assuming that H-coding truly was an automatic occurrence that happened within a day or two of the carcass's arrival at the ALC and that problems rarely inhibited the process. This assumption was based on assurances from both ILC and Ogden ALC personnel that the requisitions that did not automatically get H-coded were a very small percentage of the total. Projected shipping times were determined by using the first requisition status provided. The SAMIS product listed the history of the requisition transaction status codes assigned and reflected the first status and processing time sent to the customer. The most common status was "BB" meaning that the item was backordered against a due-in to stock. However, many assets were immediately available and the status code was "BA" to

show that the requisition item was being processed for release and shipment. Rarely did the status of the transaction reflect anything other than BB or BA dates (11:35). The SAMIS product also included shipping dates found on the "AS3" lines which indicated the shipping status to distribution. The first section of the pipeline, from the time the customer's demand is initiated until the carcass arrives at the ALC and the H-coded requisition enters the depot's computer, is similar to what is known as "order time" in the USAF's Recoverable Consumption Item Requirements System (DO41). The other part of the pipeline we looked at, which was from the time the requisition was Hcoded until the ALC shipped the asset back to the customer, is identical to the "depot processing time" in the DO41. Order time, depot processing time, and "shipping time" (the time from when the ALC ships the part until the customer receives it) are the three components of what is called Order and Shipping Time or "O&ST" (21:19). We did not try to estimate the final pipeline component because we had no way to track most of the parts shipped from the ALC back to the consumer.

#### Statistical Analysis

In performing a statistical analysis on the data collected from SAMIS, the following calculation methods and tools were used: arithmetic means, standard deviations, confidence intervals, box and whisker plots, the Wilcoxon

Signed Rank Test, and the Two-Sample T Test. This section describes each of these topics separately and how they applied to the data.

Box and whiskers plots of the complete data set showed numerous probable outliers and extreme values which skewed the distribution. These plots are provided in figure 2 for the pipeline times from the time the customer initiated the requisition until it was H-coded and from H-coding until shipment from the ALC. Outliers are the most extreme measurements that stand out from the rest of the sample and may be faulty, either incorrectly recorded observations or belonging to a different population than the rest of the sample (16:126). Since our research question focused on what the customer could typically expect for response times, the population we were interested in was typical pipeline times; therefore, we assumed the outermost values to be atypical and probably represented data that had been either entered incorrectly into the computer system, incorrectly transcribed during data collection, or had actually suffered delays probably caused by problems we discuss in chapter four. A full description of box and whisker plots is provided later in this section.




Figure 2. Box & Whisker Plots for Total Data Set




Figure 3. Box & Whisker Plots for Reduced Data Set

To ensure that the sample provided a highly acceptable, convincing representation of repair and replace requisitions, we consulted with Dr. Ben Williams, professor of statistics at AFIT. Dr. Williams reviewed our data and provided guidance to help us achieve that goal. He suggested removing the upper ten percent of the distribution tail in consideration of any random occurrences that would not depict normal flow of an asset through the pipeline. He further suggested taking confidence intervals based on the remaining data (25). For our analysis, we chose to use 90 percent confidence intervals. Box and whisker plots in figure 3 clearly show the effect of reducing the original data set by 10 percent. A full description of box and whisker plots is provided later in this section.

We looked at the individual distributions of the total reduced data set, the data relating to programmed requisitions only, and the data relating to non-programmed requisitions only. In each of these specific cases, separate evaluations were performed and ten percent of each of the distributions was removed. Since the distributions were almost always one-tailed this meant that the data removed came from the upper ten percent. The only exception to this was when we calculated the differences projected and actual shipping times and found a more normal distribution with two tails. We removed ten percent of this data by taking five percent from each tail. By normalizing the data

in this manner, we could feel confident that our analysis would provide typical characteristics.

To perform all of these calculations, the data was entered into <u>Statistix</u> (version 3.5), an interactive statistical analysis program. This software was convenient to use and easily calculated descriptive statistics in addition to performing comparison tests such as the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test and the Two-Sample T Test.

Arithmetic Mean. A popular and easily understood measure of central tendency for a quantitative data set is the arithmetic mean. "The mean of a set of quantitative data is the sum of the measurements divided by the number of measurements contained in the data set" (16:83). In nontechnical terms, this arithmetic mean is the average value of the data set. We used the arithmetic mean to provide a typical representation of the time for an asset to flow through the pipeline sections.

Standard Deviation. A method for determining the variability of the data is through the use of the standard deviation. The standard deviation is calculated as the "positive square root of the sample variance" (16:99). The variance is the sum of the squared distances from the mean divided by the number of measurements minus one. The standard deviation is a frequently used measure of spread because it improves interpretability by removing the variance's square and expressing the deviations in their original units (12:473). For example, the deviations were

in "days" rather than "square days" when we viewed pipeline phase variability.

The Empirical Rule states that 68 percent of sample will fall within one standard deviation of the mean.

Likewise, 95 percent will fall within two standard deviations and 98 percent will fall within three standard deviations of the mean.

Confidence Intervals. Unlike point estimators, such as the arithmetic mean, confidence intervals have some measure of reliability known as the confidence coefficient associated with them, and for that reason are generally preferred to point estimators (16:314). A confidence interval provides both an upper and lower boundary which could reasonably be expected to contain the mean within the confidence coefficient percent of times. For example, at a 90 percent confidence coefficient, we could expect the average time for a particular phase of the pipeline to average between the two boundaries 90 percent of the time.

Box and Whisker Plot. A box and whisker plot is based on the quartiles of a data set. Quartiles are values which partition the data into four groups, each containing 25 percent of the measurements. The lower quartile is the 25th percentile, the middle quartile is the median or 50th percentile, and the upper quartile is the 75th percentile. The box is determined by the interquartile range, the distance between the lower and upper quartiles, and represents 50 percent of the observations. The whiskers are

constructed by establishing two sets of limits, the inner fences and the outer fences. The inner fences are located at a distance of one and a half times the interquartile range from the ends of the box and emanate from the box ends with lines referred to as whiskers. The two whiskers extend to the most extreme observations inside the inner fences. Values beyond the inner fences receive special attention because they are extreme values that represent relatively rare occurrences. These values are depicted on the plot with an "\*". The outer fences are located at a distance of three times the interquartile range from each end of the box. Values beyond the outer fence are extremely rare and must be evaluated as potential outliers. These values are depicted on the plot with an "O" (16:125).

Parametric Versus Nonparametric Testing. As we mentioned at the beginning of this section, the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test and the Two-Sample T Test were both used for performing the statistical analysis. To understand the reasoning for using both parametric and nonparametric testing in our methodology, a brief explanation is necessary to describe the relationship between the testing criteria and our data distributions.

Parametric testing requires the assumption that the data are normally distributed. When the data do not meet this criteria of normality, a nonparametric test is more appropriate. Using normality as the basic criteria, "parametric tests are generally more powerful [than] their

nonparametric equivalents, although nonparametric tests often compare quite well in performance" (22:203). Figures 4a, 4b, and 4c show the dis ributions from the reduced data <u>set</u> that were evaluated and clearly indicate that a normal distribution is not evident in every phase of the pipeline being tested. For example, while the histograms for programmed and non-programmed H-coding times (PHCODE and NHCODE) present normally distributed data, the remainder of the histograms, which include programmed and non-programmed times for shipping (PSHIP and NSHIP) and total times from customer initiation until shipping from TRC (PTOTAL and NTOTAL) exhibit other than normal characteristics. Since the assumption of normality is not always met, the nonparametric Wilcoxon Signed Ranked Test was determined to be more appropriate. However, we chose to perform a parametric Two-Sample T Test as an additional measure of comparison and validation.




Figure 4a. Histograms

```
FREQUENCY (DAYS) HISTOGRAM OF PSHIP
 180 +
    :****
    ****
 150 +****
    ****
    ****
 120 +****
    \****
    |****
  90 +****
    \*****
    | ****
  60 +****
    |*******
    *******
  30 +*******
    . ********************
    *******************************
   30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300
        325 CASES PLOTTED O MISSING CASES
FREQUENCY (DAYS)
              HISTOGRAM OF NSHIP
120 +
100 +****
   | ****
   ****
80 +****
   ****
   ****
60 +****
   ****
   |*******
40 +*******
   ******
   |******
   ***********************
   <del>| ****************************</del>
 0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300
       263 CASES PLOTTED O MISSING CASES
```

Figure 4b. Histograms




Figure 4c. Histograms

Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test. This is a nonparametric procedure which tests the hypothesis that the frequency distributions for the two groups are identical. It is determined by ranking, or putting in order, each sample and summing the ranks. "If the rank sums are very different, the implication is that the two samples may have come from different populations" (16:954). This type of evaluation was also used to compare the pipeline times of programmed and non-programmed requisitions as a comparison to the parametric Two-Sample T Test. Because our data did not always meet the criteria of normality suggested for parametric testing, we decided to perform both types of evaluations. Although this nonparametric test is less accurate than a parametric test, the distributions and variances were probably better suited for it.

Two-Sample T Test. This parametric statistical procedure tests for the differences between the means of two independent samples. Two T Tests are computed, one assuming equal group variances and the other assuming different group variances (22:212). A test for equality of the variances is then performed, this is the F-statistic, and a P-value is calculated. The F-statistic is a statistical procedure to check the validity of equal variances in the means of two samples. The procedure for comparing sample variances makes an inference about the ratio of the sample variances with the larger sample variance being divided by the smaller sample variance (16:412-413). As the ratio nears one, the

two samples are considered to have statistically equal distributions. This type of evaluation was also used to compare programmed and non-programmed requisition pipeline phases. The P-value, or the observed significance level, for a specific statistical test is "the probability of observing a value of the test statistic that is at least as contradictory to the null hypothesis (and as supportive of the alternative hypothesis) as the one computed from the sample data" (16:361).

### Personal Interviews

Personal, face-to-face interviewing is a two-way conversation initiated by an interviewer to obtain information from a respondent. The greatest value of such an interview is the quality of information that can be secured in both depth and detail. The success of a personal interview is dependent upon three broad conditions: (1) availability of the needed information from the respondent, (2) an understanding by the respondent of his or her role, and (3) adequate motivation by the respondent to cooperate. Disadvantages associated with personal interviews include being time-consuming and also that the results can be adversely affected by inconsistent, untrained interviewers (12:320-321). Personal interviews were conducted with liaison officers to gather information pertaining to FMS reparable pipeline problems from the customer's viewpoint.

Interviewing FMS customers was accomplished by meeting

with liaison officers from different countries. Many countries are represented by liaison officers working at the International Logistics Center located at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. Officers from Israel, Egypt, and other countries were chosen to interview because of the number of F-16s their countries currently own. Rather than use a fixed set of questions to ask, a structured interview format was prepared to facilitate standardization. This format enabled us to guide the discussion and keep the FLOs talking about certain areas of interest related to the repair and replace pipeline. Our interview format is reproduced in Appendix B.

# Effect-Cause-Effect Diagram

A tool popularized by Eliyahu Goldratt's "Theory of Constraints" was used to help illustrate how the problems are caused within the reparable return process. "In using the effect-cause-effect method we strive to explain the existence of many natural effects by postulating a minimum number of assumptions," according to Goldratt. The effect-cause-effect method identifies core problems (13:22-25). An effect-cause-effect diagram (or "current event tree") was developed to help understand how some of the basic assumptions about the repair/replace program can be violated and how problems result. This diagram was used to help us visualize how various problems effected other aspects of the repair/replace pipeline.

To read an effect-cause-effect (E-C-E) diagram, start at a block and read its contents. If the diagram has been built sufficiently, the statement should be clear and easy to understand. Assuming that the reader does not challenge the statement, it follows that "IF" the statement is true, "THEN" the following statement (at the end of the arrow) is the result. Multiple arrows leading to a statement and gathered together by an oval represent a situation where more than one event is required for the following statement to be true. In this case, the oval is read as a "logical and." For example, E-C-E number 1 in figure 5 reads, "if A and/or B, then C." When the arrows are linked, as in E-C-E number 2, it reads "if A and B, then C." The E-C-E diagram logically links undesirable effects (UDEs) together. The UDEs that were used to build the diagram (in figures 7a and 7b in chapter four) relate to the problems identified through discussions with Foreign Liaison Officers and USAF logistics specialists.




Figure 5. E-C-E Examples

## Summary

This chapter presented the methodology we used to perform our research. Descriptions of the different areas of investigation were provided as well as an explanation justifying our choices of research procedures. Furthermore, we described selected methods of statistical evaluation which enabled us to analyze the data collected on repair and replace requisitions.

## IV. Research Findings

#### Chapter Overview

The purpose of this chapter is to provide answers to the research questions posed in chapter one. As an introduction, there is a brief description of the repair and replace pipeline processes that are used to move assets requiring repair from the customer's operation to the point where replacement requisitions are filled and shipped back to the customer. Furthermore, problems discovered in the course of our research that are associated with the reparable pipeline will be illustrated and discussed.

### Repair and Replace Processes

When an FMS customer needs to return an asset under the repair and replace program, the asset is shipped through a freight forwarder to a USAF repair facility or "technical repair center" (TRC) which is usually at one of the five ALCs. However, several things must occur in order for the customer to receive an asset in return. The customer must ensure that the asset in question is covered under an appropriate FMS case and is authorized to be sent for repair to a USAF repair facility. This may be accomplished in one of two ways. The asset may be pre-authorized for repair or the customer may request special permission for repair. The approval is then indicated on a Material Repair Requirements List (MRRL) as either "pre-authorized" or "manual." The

country's MRRL indicates an "entry date" which reflects the date on which a particular national stock number (NSN) was first added to the list. There is also an "expiration date" on the MRRL, after which the ALC will no longer accept the item back for repair. This time frame from entry date to expiration date is usually 180 days (2:13.74). Once the carcass is received at a USAF repair facility, the requisition is transformed into an H-coded transaction indicating that it is an approved FMS requisition. The requisitions and those of the USAF in accordance with priorities established by UMMIPS. Figure 6 illustrates the basic repair and replace process after the carcass arrives at the TRC.




Figure 6. Basic Repair and Replace Process

MRRL Process. As mentioned above, an asset may be on the MRRL in one of two ways, preauthorized or manual. For preauthorization, items which are on the customer country's CLSSA stock level case (FMSO I) or which are members of an Interchangeability and Substitution (I&S) family whose master is on the stock level case may be preauthorized if they meet all eligibility criteria, including a valid USAF repair source. Repair of these items may then take place under the CLSSA requisition case (FMSO II). A monthly listing of preauthorized national stock numbers (NSNs) is provided to the country. This listing is the preauthorized MRRL. The manual MRRL is used for those items which are not preauthorized for repair. To obtain a manual MRRL, the customer must request repair of an asset not covered under their FMSO I and FMSO II cases (2:11-1).

Shipping. Once a customer has verified repair authority through the MRRL, it is the customer's responsibility to arrange for shipment of the reparable to the USAF within the designated time frame. The customer may not substitute the items with NSNs different than the ones approved.

Furthermore, the customer may not return items to any TRC other than the one listed on the MRRL for that NSN. If the customer is returning more than one item to the same TRC, it is the customer's responsibility to mark the container appropriately, i.e. "MULTIPACK". It is also the customer's responsibility to arrange for the freight forwarding and to make necessary coordination efforts to allow for the

clearance of the assets through U.S. customs. All FMS returns will be allowed to enter the U.S. duty free provided a customs declaration form accompanies each reparable shipment. When the asset is received by the ALC, DS will verify the NSN, quantity, and condition of the asset and create a D6E computerized receipt transaction for what is actually received, not on what is documented by the customer as having been sent (10:14.71-72).

Replacement Requisition (H-Code) Processing. After DS enters the D&E receipt transaction, the H-coding process is as follows:

- 1. SAMIS receives the D&E receipt transaction and attempts to match it to either a preauthorized or manual Material Repair Requirements List (MRRL) suspense transaction. This suspense refers to the time frame in which repair and replace transactions are available according to the current MRRL.
  - 2. If a match occurs, SAMIS:
- a. Automatically creates a replacement requisition known as an H-code (an "H" is placed in position 40 of the new requisition number).
- b. Assigns the priority shown in the MRRL. If the priority is blank, as is the case for preauthorized suspenses, priority 15 is assigned. (Recent policy changes, which will be explained in more detail later, authorized case managers to elevate this priority to the highest level possible within the country's FAD.)

- c. Automatically creates a status transaction that cross references the return carcass document number (position 8 through 22) with the replacement requisition document number.
- d. Commits case funds in the appropriate amount to cover average repair costs (ARC); the stock list price (SLP); packing, crating, and handling (PCH); and condemnations.
- e. Codes the requisition as either programmed or non-programmed. A requisition is programmed when the returned material is on the FMSO I and the requisition is less than or equal to the eligible-to-be-programmed quantity (EPQ). The EPQ is then reduced by the quantity of the programmed requisition (equal to the quantity returned) for 90 days, after which the EPQ reverts to its original level. An H-coded requisition is non-programmed when the returned material is not on the FMSO I or the requisition quantity is greater than the available EPQ.

At this point, if serviceable stock is available, the H-coded requisition is filled based on priority restrictions and shipped to the customer. Otherwise the requisition is backordered (2:11.5-11.6).

### Research Questions

The remainder of this chapter addresses our four research questions. The first question was: "At what point do FMS reparables fall under USAF control or influence in

the pipeline?" As previously mentioned, this question was answered during our literature review. We considered the section of the pipeline from the point that the assets arrive at an ALC for repair until the point where the customer's requisition is filled and shipped from the ALC to be under the direct control of the USAF. Furthermore, we considered the shipment of unserviceable assets from the customer to the appropriate TRCs to be influenced by the USAF because shipping procedures are dictated by USAF regulations.

#### Customer's General Perceptions of FMS

Our second research question was: "What are the customer's views of the USAF reparable pipeline and what do they perceive to be the biggest problems?" To answer this research question, personal interviews were conducted with foreign liaison officers stationed at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. Since each FLO represented a country with unique FMS requirements, the interviews were only structured enough to get each FLO to share their individual perceptions, both good and bad. The basic format used for guiding the interviews in this way can be found in Appendix B.

While each FLO was very helpful, there was often a feeling that they were holding back a little in their criticism of the system and, conversely, that they were too generous in their praise. This can be explained by the political and diplomatic nature of the FLOs' jobs, and so it

is important to note that their responses may not have been the most accurate for the purpose of gathering information related to FMS customer satisfaction. To compound this problem further, FLOs are often sensitive to what other countries may find out about the particulars of their FMS involvement with the USAF. Not knowing us and what we may tell other FLOs during our interviews, they may have been reluctant to divulge information (4). Therefore, the data collected from the foreign liaison officers may be considered inaccurate due to what Emory and Cooper called "response error." Response error occurs when data reported differ from the actual data for a variety of reasons including when the interview respondent fails to report fully and accurately. Respondents may find it difficult to report fully and accurately on topics that they regard as sensitive in nature (12:328). With this in mind, it would be understandable if the FLOs felt the interview topics were sensitive considering their positions as representatives of their countries. Although the information could have been considered inaccurate, we found that many of the FLO's perceptions were similar and verifiable through contacts with logistics specialists working in ILC, and therefore it was still of interest to us.

Foreign liaisons from Turkey, Venezuela, Israel, Greece, Indonesia, Singapore, Spain, and Egypt were interviewed. Most of the respondents expressed that FMS did a good job providing the systems and support their countries

needed. When the FLOs were asked to describe the problems they saw, many indicated that there were no real problems with the system and that most problems that did occur were their own (the customer's) fault. For example, problems were often the result of not properly following procedures which often indicated a need for more training or experience on the part of the customer. Another problem beyond the control of the USAF was that most customers lacked an adequate tracking system to provide them with visibility of their assets in the pipeline.

An overview of the FLOs' reported perceptions of FMS problems in general, and the repair and replace program in particular, follows:

- a. Item managers did not adequately update shipping information.
- b. Problems were caused by the lack of long-range logistical planning on the part of the customers who had not learned how to provide proper support for complicated and sophisticated weapon systems.
- c. Some believed that the USAF was not customeroriented.
- d. In general, customers had fewer problems working with a particular ALC when another FLO was stationed at that ALC. When the FLOs were asked whether or not they perceived one ALC to be better than the rest, they did not indicate a favorite ALC; however, in most cases FLOs thought that they had the most problems with San Antonio ALC. (The upcoming

section which discusses policy changes involving FMS repair and replace will include an explanation of possible contributing factors that could lead to such customer perceptions about San Antonio ALC in addition to a brief description of ongoing efforts to improve the support provided there.)

- e. Many stated that ALCs needed to track incoming parts. Item managers did not know when parts were on the way or when they were received.
- f. USAF work capacity was not being used to full potential to provide customer support.
- g. Practically all FLOs agreed that the H-coding process took too long.
- h. Some did not see the advantage to buying into CLSSA because they could not tell much difference between the treatment of programmed and non-programmed requisitions.
  - i. SAMIS tracking ability was not good enough.
- j. There was no feedback from ALC or ILC to indicate immediate receipt of assets. Therefore, if problems came up after the carcass arrived at the ALC and H-coding did not automatically occur, the customer had no way of knowing.
- k. No real visibility of items in the pipeline made it difficult to tell when something was lost or missing.
- l. The quality of repair work at ALCs needed to improve. Broken items were sometimes received from ALC.
  - m. The priority system did not treat customers right.

Process Problems and Causes. In order to for us to comprehend "the big picture" better, we also talked to logistics specialists at the International Logistics Center and asked them to explain to us the problems involved in the replacement requisition process. Their insights enabled us to understand some of the causes of the problems mentioned by the FLOs.

To start with, customers felt that H-coding was far from being the "automatic" process it was meant to be. However, typical problems which slow down the replacement requisition process and add to the time it takes to get a requisition H-coded are associated with improper requisitioning practices on the part of the customer, i.e. the customer not following USAF regulated guidance. For example, if parts are returned under a repair and replace program without ensuring that they are covered by either a preauthorized or manual MRRL (that is, establishing whether or not the items are currently authorized to be returned for repair) then there will not be a match when the D6E is compared to the MRRLs if the item is not listed. Another typical problem is due to improper shipping practices such as sending multiple assets in a container to a single ALC, even though some of the items need to go to other ALCs for repair. When this occurs, the first receiving ALC will frequently forward parts to the correct technical repair center without notifying either the customer or the ILC. As a result, since the parts have not been "received" yet, the

parts lose their identify as an FMS asset. Hence, the TRC receives parts that are believed to belong to the USAF and the FMS asset appears to be lost because of the misrouting. However, in spite of these problems, only a very small percentage of customer requisitions fail to get H-coded automatically (6).

Aside from these issues, other USAF policies or practices were also found to contribute further to customer difficulties with the repair procedures. Some of these were:

- 1. The requirement that USAF funds had to be available to do the repair, in spite of the fact that the FMS requisition was fully funded. Depot purchased equipment maintenance (DPEM) money was needed to cover the repair expense before customer funds were used. Therefore, if the USAF did not have funds available to cover repairs, the customer's requisitions could not be filled even though the customer had already paid.
- 2. The requirement that reparable carcasses had to be in the USAF's possession before replacement assets could be shipped to fill a requisition.
- 3. Item managers could use FMS carcasses to support condemnations and other USAF requirements rather than purchasing more assets. While it was understood how the UMMIPS priority system would result in the USAF having priority over FMS customers, the requisition system was not

designed to encourage item managers to plan for FMS requirements and buy assets accordingly.

4. There were opportunities to discriminate against FMS customers. For example, if two countries submitted similar requisitions with identical priorities at different times, favoritism could be practiced by filling the more recent requisition first.

Effect—Cause—Effect Diagram. To illustrate the different kinds of problems within the repair and replace process, an effect—cause—effect diagram was developed. The E—C—E diagram helped to visualize how problems occur by stringing together a sequence of possible events and describing the ensuing effects. This diagram is by no means intended to reflect all of the possible problems within the repair and replace requisition process, but rather it is meant to highlight the most common problems we learned about in the course of our research.

An item manager review (IMR) conducted from 23 March to 17 April 1992, that included a review of all ALCs except Warner-Robins over the previous year, identified problem areas very similar to those we mentioned here. The IMR investigation was not limited to the repair and replace pipeline the way our research was and therefore represented a much broader range of support. However, it was interesting to note that the IMR findings showed that approximately ten percent of the problems found were related to supporting Desert Shield and Desert Storm and the

material shortages that resulted, particularly involving parts for C-130 transport aircraft (6). The accompanying E-C-E diagram does not include problems associated with any shortages generated by the Persian Gulf War.




Figure 7a. Effect-Cause-Effect Diagram (Part 1)




Figure 7b. Effect-Cause-Effect Diagram (Part 2)

#### Policy Issues

Our third research question was: "What repair and replace program policy issues have been addressed as a result of the current heightened interest in FMS logistical support?" We researched these policy issues primarily through personal interviews with ILC Policy Office (XMXB) personnel. In the course of our discussions we found that during a tour of the ALCs by the AFLC commander, General McDonald, a presentation at Oklahoma City ALC brought to his attention various difficulties in supporting foreign reparables. As a result, General McDonald elevated . management attention at all levels initially by sending each ALC commander the previously mentioned letter that stressed the importance of improving the level of support offered to our FMS customers and stating that new policy would be forthcoming. Here we address the policy issues by reviewing suggested policy changes and discussing their current status.

In May, 1991, shortly after General McDonald's letter, a message from AFLC/XR (Items Requirements Directorate) to all appropriate ALC organizations outlined policy changes either implemented or being considered (20). Following is a brief description of each new policy mentioned in that message including current status updates as of June 1992.

1. Policy: Increase the priorities of existing and newly created H-coded requisitions to the highest priority

allowable within the country/case FAD. It was the intention

of this policy to let FMS repair and replace requisitions compete more effectively with USAF and other requisitions for both repair negotiations and asset allocation.

Status: This policy was implemented by ILC/XMX (Policy Office) with a letter to each case manager on 26 April 91. All requisitions were manually upgraded by the case managers and FLOs indicated that the action was visible to the customer and was effective. A change to the SAMIS case records was implemented which allowed for an automated capability to establish the appropriate priority when the Hcoded requisition is created. The change allows the case manager to enter into the case record the priority to be assigned for that case. ILC/XMX recommends that the case managers use the highest priority allowed but the final priority is set by the case manager. One possible exception to the use of this priority is for preauthorized MRRLs which have a higher priority. In this case the highest priority takes precedence and is assigned for that requisition.

2. Policy: H-coded requisitions will be treated as fully funded repair requirements.

Explanation: In the past, ALC item managers used the overall shortage of depot purchased equipment maintenance (DPEM) program funds as a reason for not providing timely support. It was perceived to be advantageous to obligate the FMS funds as soon as possible since reimbursable authority for FMS repair requirements was projected and

authorized each fiscal year based on historical data. For this reason, the implementation of such a policy eliminated USAF funding shortages as an excuse for untimely support.

Status: The AFLC/CC letter to each ALC directed that the FMS repair backlog be cleared up and emphasized that, since FMS repairs were fully funded, timely repairs were appropriate. Representatives from the ILC visited each ALC and performed item management reviews to evaluate the various causes for delays in supporting older FMS repair requirements and reported the findings to AFLC requirements and item management directorates. Their findings could not adequately support the idea that funding practices were a concern. The long range goal of this policy was to create alternate funding methodologies for FMS reparables. However, Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) rejected this proposal and as late as June 1992, General McDonald stated that funding was not an appropriate reason for untimely support and that this was no longer an issue for consideration (24). However, ILC policy personnel continued to pursue changes in funding practices. ILC felt that a more appropriate way to address this problem was to "fence" FMS repair money. Their proposed change to the repair and replace funding process would provide money for the repair of FMS assets even when USAF DPEM funding priorities are placed elsewhere. This would keep the FMS customers from having to wait for the USAF to fund repairs that the customer has already paid for.




Figure 8. Improved Support Repair and Replace Process (14)

A diagram of the proposed change can be found in figure 8 and is supplied to provide a contrast to the basic repair and replace process previously diagrammed in figure 6. This chart of the proposal to improve support for the repair and replace process clearly shows the link between the fenced "FMS FUNDS" and "REQUISITION PREPOSITIONED" to indicate that those funds would be available to cover the costs if DPEM funds were not.

3. Policy: H-coded requisitions will be considered and treated as a request for a service rather than as a requisition. (Note: The standard requisition format is used only because it is identifiable within all of the affected data systems.)

Explanation: The intent of this policy was to change the philosophy used by the USAF to improve the support provided to FMS customers. Unlike regular requisitions, in these cases the USAF had already received a reparable carcass from the customer and funding was obligated for the repair of the item only. We could not buy to fill the requirement but had to fill the requisition with assets on hand, due-in, or through repair since new procurement is not authorized for the repair and replace program (10:8.103).

Status: Action was taken at all ALCs, the ILC, and HQ AFLC to help create this change in philosophy. These changes consisted of such things as the introduction of an HQ AFLC FMS Repair Replace Tiger Team and ALC Process Action Teams (PAT). Also, ILC developed and presented item manager

short courses. The goal was to educate USAF personnel so that they may better understand the impact of improved support for America's allies. Nowhere was the need for improved support more noticeable than during Desert Shield/Storm when it became obvious that U.S. allies combat capabilities in the Persian Gulf were directly linked to FMS support. Therefore, the Persian Gulf War provided further emphasis and helped change the old mind set.

4. Policy: H-coded non-programmed requisitions will be treated as programmed 90 days after receipt at the ALC.

Explanation: Under regulatory guidance, non-programmed requisitions suspense computations were based on 180 days after receipt in the DO35 system. By reducing this period to 90 days allowed assets to be released to lower support levels sooner. The waiting period would not be reduced further in order to continue the incentives inherent in the CLSSA buy-in concept, such as requisitions being filled much faster, and ensure that projected requirements are included in the USAF total computations.

Status: Item managers were given the authority to manually treat non-programmed H-coded requisitions over 90 days old as programmed with the receipt of the message which outlined these policy issues, May 1991 (20:4). The reduced waiting period was automated in the DO35 system in January 1992, relieving the item managers of the responsibility of having to manually input the change. Interviews with FLOs

indicated that the action was visible to the customer and was effective.

5. Policy: Change the distribution logic in the USAF computer network to put H-coded requirements higher in the pecking order for serviceable asset release.

Explanation: This "distribution logic" basically referred to the way that an asset could be diverted to any requisition as long as it was still under the ALC's control and had not actually been shipped. Therefore, even though FMS funds were obligated for repair of assets and an item was destined to fill an H-coded requisition, the asset could still be pulled at any time to fill higher priority requisitions. Since H-coded requirements were not "normal" requisitions, they should not have been constrained by the normal distribution pecking order.

Status: An initial six month test program was planned in early 1991 but due to Desert Storm and the amount of increased workload to do manually, the test was placed on hold pending automation and subsequently was dropped as a possible policy change.

6. Policy: Establish a method to ensure that assets are released to those customers for whom funds were obligated.

Explanation: Implementation of this policy would ensure that a customer's funded requisition is filled, regardless of priority, prior to that of a non-funded requisition. If alternate methods of funding were to be developed, this type of accounting would be mandatory.

Furthermore, if such a policy were to lead to an automated procedure, it would enhance the system ability to distribute assets properly.

Status: To coincide with ILC's suggested funding change described in paragraph two above, the ILC developed a proposal in which FMS items at the point of entering repair receive a "mark-for" designation and once the repairs are completed, the asset is shipped to that destination through normal shipping channels rather than entering back into the normal supply stock. In other words, once a customer provided the funds for a particular asset to be repaired, that asset would not be re-routed to another activity with a higher priority. At the time of this writing, the Tiger Team was continuing to examine possible procedures and impacts.

Observations. In researching these policy issues, several items were observed worth noting. First, as a result of the efforts to achieve a change in philosophy toward FMS support, representatives from the ILC personally trained approximately 890 item managers. Interestingly, after ILC announced visits to each ALC to conduct item manager reviews on older H-coded requisitions, many of the older requisitions were released by the item managers. Additionally, the efforts of the HQ AFLC Tiger Team and ALC PAT teams resulted in lowered H-coded service orders over one year old at all ALCs. The reductions ranged from a low of five percent at Sacramento ALC to a high of 31 percent at

Warner-Robins ALC for the period from May 1991 to April 1991 (23). Table 3 shows the progress made by all of the ALCs over that period of time.

PERCENTAGES OF OPEN H-CODED REQUISITIONS
OVER ONE YEAR OLD BY ALC (23)

ALC	May 91	Sep 91	Dec 91	Apr 92
oc	30	25	23	23
00	18	13	12	11
SA	26	23	15	17
SM	34	20	29	29
WR	51	26	21	20

As previously noted, many of the Foreign Liaison
Officers indicated that the ALC they had the most problems
with was San Antonio. A possible explanation for this could
have been that recent changes in organizational structure
moved many of Sacramento ALC's assets to responsibility
centers at San Antonio. It was reasonable to expect that
the additional workload on San Antonio, particularly when
many of the transferred systems (and their historical
problems) were older, could cause difficulties until
adjustments could be made to the new work requirements.
These problems were recognized and addressed by suggesting
additional manpower be added to the San Antonio ALC FMS
focal point office staff to better handle the workload of
FMS problems. Furthermore, as of June 1992, a test program

was implemented at San Antonio which gave item managers the authority to work outside normal UMMIPS priorities and procedures. Once immediate USAF requirements and MICAPs were taken care of, item managers were allowed to use their own discretion and best judgement to determine what H-coded requisitions to release, regardless of the age of the requisition.

#### Statistical Analysis

A standard comprehensive requisition data product from SAMIS that reflected those F-16 repair and replace requisitions that had shipped in a six month period provided the data used in our analysis. To approximate the times when the customer initiated the requisition, we used the julian date from the original customer document number. It is also important to note that while the exact dates that the carcasses arrived at the ALCs were not available, they could be approximated by the dates of the H-coded requisition numbers, assuming that most requisitions arrived and were H-coded automatically within a few days and without any problems. Projected shipping times were determined by using the first requisition status provided. The SAMIS product showed the history of the requisition transaction status codes assigned and reflected the first status that the customer would have received. The most common status was "BB" meaning that the item was backordered against a due-in to stock. Sometimes assets were immediately

available and the status code was "BA" meaning that the requisition item was being processed for release and shipment. In only a few cases did the status of the transaction reflect other than BB or BA dates (11:35). The SAMIS product also included shipping dates found on the "AS3" lines (shipping status to distribution) and programmed source codes which told us whether the requisition was programmed or non-programmed.

The data consisted of 656 actual H-coded requisitions from Venezuela, Turkey, Thailand, Netherlands, South Korea, Indonesia, Greece, Egypt, Denmark, Belgium, and Bahrain which were shipped between 19 December 1991 and 19 June 1992. The breakdown of requisitions by country is presented in figure 9. The data consisted of 293 requisitions that were non-programmed and 363 that were programmed and was loaded into a spreadsheet for sorting and initial evaluation. The subsequent statistical study was performed using the analytical software package <a href="Statistix">Statistix</a> (version 3.5). Calculations were performed to determine the means, standard deviations, and confidence intervals for each of the different areas of interest. The Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test and the Two-Sample T Test were also used to compare programmed and non-programmed requisitions.




Figure 9. Number of Requisitions By Country

Findings. Our final research question was: "What can an FMS customer typically expect in terms of response times for the replacement requisition process?" The remainder of this section answers this question as the findings that resulted from the statistical analysis are presented.

Total Data Set. To keep our results in perspective, general information pertaining to the entire data sample (before it was reduced by ten percent) indicated the following:

- a. On average, it took approximately 86 days from the time a customer started a requisition until it was received and H-coded in the USAF system.
- b. On average, the USAF shipped an asset to fill the requisition 112 days after H-coding.
- c. Overall, from the time a customer initiated a repair and replace requisition until that requisition was filled (shipped from the TRC) took an average of 198 days.
- d. The requisitions were filled an average of 306 days prior to the first projected shipping date. In other words, the initial projections, on average, exceeded the actual time an ALC took to ship a requisition by 306 days.
- e. In only 13 percent of the programmed cases examined did requisitions take longer to fill than what was originally projected by the USAF, and less than 16 percent of the cases for non-programmed. The projected dates had been indicated normally by the initial BB status. A possible explanation for the ALCs beating the projected time

by such a large margin is that BB status is typically a very rough estimate based on a worst case scenario. (Note: Statistix was not used to determine these percentages. They were calculated by counting the number of requisitions exceeding their projected ship dates and dividing by the total number of requisitions in the sample.)

Reduced Data Set. As we mentioned in the methodology chapter, we decided to remove ten percent of the data to ensure that our statistical analysis provided typical pipeline characteristics. The remainder of the statistical information presented in this chapter was based upon that reduced sample.

- a. It took an average of approximately 55 days from the time a customer started a requisition until it was received and H-coded.
- b. On average, the USAF shipped an asset to fill the requisition about 72 days after H-coding.
- c. From the time a customer initiated a repair and replace requisition until that requisition was shipped from the TRC took an average of around 148 days.
- d. The reduced data showed that requisitions were filled an average of 299 days prior to the first projected shipping date.

<u>Programmed Versus Non-programmed</u>. The following information was obtained by differentiating between programmed and non-programmed requisitions:

- a. Programmed requisitions were H-coded, on average, 53 days after initiation of the requisition while non-programmed requisitions took an average of 57 days. For programmed requisitions, the 90 percent confidence interval was from 51 to 55 days with a standard deviation of 21 days with a range of 20 to 107 days. For non-programmed requisitions, the 90 percent confidence interval was from 55 to 59 days with a standard deviation of 23 days with a range of 5 to 121 days.
- b. Requisitions were filled and shipped, on average, 60 days and 85 days after H-coding for programmed and non-programmed respectively. The 90 percent confidence intervals were 54 to 66 days for programmed, with a standard deviation of 67 days and a range from 3 to 248 days, and 76 to 94 for non-programmed, with a standard deviation of 88 days and a range from 2 to 328 days.
- c. Overall, from the time a customer initiated a repair and replace requisition until the requisition was filled (shipped from the TRC) the average was 132 days for programmed and 167 days for non-programmed. The 90 percent confidence intervals were 123 to 141 and 155 to 180 days respectively. Programmed requisitions had a standard deviation of 97 days and a range of 27 to 439 days and non-programmed had a standard deviation of 121 days with a range of 25 to 495 days.
- d. Programmed requisitions were typically filled 251 days prior to the first projected shipping date provided to

the customer and non-programmed items were usually shipped an average of 397 days earlier than the first projected shipping date. The 90 percent confidence intervals were 240 to 266 for programmed and 366 to 427 for non-programmed. The standard deviation was 119 for programmed with a range of 356 days early to 39 days past the projected date. The standard deviation was 299 for non-programmed with a range of 990 days early to 49 days past the projected date.

- e. In only 8 percent of the programmed cases examined did requisitions take longer to fill than what was originally projected by the USAF, and less than 12 percent of the cases for non-programmed.
- Sample T Test to evaluate both the total data set and 90 percent of the data after removing outliers, the programmed and non-programmed requisitions statistically proved to be significantly different in the way they were treated for shipping times after H-coding. The ranked sums of the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test for both the total data set (Appendix D) and the reduced data set (Appendix E) were clearly different. The Two-Sample T Test validated this with a probability of less than one percent for the total data and a probability of zero for the reduced data set that these two distributions would be the same. For the size of sample used, at any probability, in order for the two samples to be considered equal the F statistic must be less than 1.00. This was not the case, in fact, the F statistics

for both total and reduced data sets were substantially greater than 1.00 showing significant difference between the samples. Table 4 provides both the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test differences and the Two-Sample T Test probabilities extracted from the appendixes.

TABLE 4.

STATISTICAL COMPARISON OF PROGRAMMED AND NON-PROGRAMMED REQUISITIONS

	Total Data	Reduced Data
Wilcoxon Signed	-2332	-1529
Rank Sums	1945	1221
Two-Sample	P = 0.0089	P = 0.0000
T Test	F = 1.30	F = 1.69

This significance should be looked at from the perspective that in 90 percent of the cases the average time to fill a requisition took only 22 days longer for a non-programmed requisition than it did to fill a programmed one. Both the parametric Two-Sample T Test and the nonparametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test yielded practically identical results which gives added support to these findings.

Interesting to note was the difference between the time it took programmed and non-programmed requisitions to get H-coded. We expected to find no difference between the two, however this was not the case. As shown previously, times for programmed requisitions averaged 53 days in 90 percent

of the cases whereas non-programmed averaged 57 days, four days longer to receive an H-coded requisition number and begin processing through the USAF channels.

Table 5 summarizes the pipeline times determined from the reduced data set for more convenient reference. Also, figure 10 presents a side-by-side comparison of programmed and non-programmed requisitions in the repair and replace pipeline and shows very clearly that FMS requirements were filled quicker when they were programmed. Sets of calculations performed on both the complete data sample and the reduced sample are presented in the form of Statistix outputs in Appendix D and Appendix E respectively.




Figure 10. Average Pipeline Times

TABLE 5.

PIPELINE TIMES IN DAYS
FOR REDUCED DATA SET (90%)

Pipeline S	egment	Prog	Non-prog	Total
Customer to H-Code	AVG	52.75	57.07	55.04
h-code	90% CI	50.86- 54.63	54.74- 59.41	53.54- 56.54
H-Code to Return	AVG	59.94	85.32	71.53
Shipping	90% CI	53.85- 66.04	76.37- 94.27	66.29- 76.77
Customer to	AVG	132.0	167.2	147.7
Return Shipping	90% CI	123.1- 140.9	154.9- 179.5	140.4- 155.1
Diff Between	AVG	251.1	396.6	299.1
Proj & Actual Return Ship	90% CI	240.2- 266.0	366.1- 427.0	285.3- 312.8

#### Summary

In this chapter we answered the research questions originally posed in chapter one. To briefly summarize, our findings were as follows:

- 1. We considered the section of the pipeline from the point that the assets arrive at an ALC for repair until the point where the customer's requisition is filled and shipped from the ALC to be under the direct control of the USAF. Furthermore, since the reparable return procedures are guided by AFM 67-1, the first part of the pipeline between the customer and the ALC was considered to be influenced, or under the indirect control, of the USAF.
- 2. Although the FLOs shared many opinions about the repair and replace program, the greatest concerns voiced most often pertained to H-coding taking too long, inability to adequately track carcasses from the time the customer sends them until the time they get H-coded, and an overall feeling that FMS is not very customer-oriented.
- 3. Policy changes that resulted since the AFLC commander announced the immediate need to improve reparable support focused a great deal on the customer concerns of H-coding. Some of those policy changes were to increase the priorities of existing and newly created H-coded recursitions to the highest priority allowable within the country/case FAD and to treat H-coded requisitions as fully funded repair requirements.

4. Finally, our statistical analysis revealed that an FMS customer can expect it to take between 54 and 58 days for a carcass to arrive at the ALC and receive an H-coded requisition number 90 percent of the time. Similarly, it took between 66 and 77 days after H-coding for the requisition to be filled and shipped from the ALC back to the customer. Further analysis differentiated between treatment of programmed and non-programmed requisitions.

# V. Conclusions and Recommendations

## Chapter Overview

The purpose of this chapter is to briefly summarize what we set out to accomplish with this thesis and to provide the conclusions we reached after researching the repair and replace pipeline and analyzing the findings presented in chapter four. Additionally, we will offer recommendations for improving the FMS reparable pipeline and suggest further areas of research we feel would be useful to gain a better understanding of the replacement requisition process.

## Summary of Research

Our specific research problem was to examine the reparable logistics pipeline and identify characteristics and associated problems with the processing of FMS repair and replace aircraft assets. The subsequent research involved three main areas of investigation: (1) examining the section of the reparable pipeline under USAF control or influence, (2) collecting data on common reparable parts for analysis, and (3) interviewing FMS customers to determine their perceptions of the replacement requisition process. The pipeline characteristics and problems were explored by reviewing pertinent literature and by talking with specialists at the International Logistics Center. The customers' perceptions were obtained by meeting with many

foreign liaison officers working at ILC. Data was also collected on FMS customer requisitions of F-16 reparables that shipped from the ALCs within a specific time period and a statistical analysis was performed to identify additional pipeline characteristics. A summary of our findings was presented in chapter four.

# Conclusions

In spite of the many concerns that customers expressed regarding replacement requisition H-coding, we found that it usually took from five to 117 days, averaging about 55 days from the date of the customer's original document number. We thought that this was a reasonable time frame considering that the returned carcasses went through freight forwarders and most probably traveled by sea. Some of the requisitions we gathered were from countries as far away as Egypt, Korea, and Indonesia which would have added significantly to the travel time. Furthermore, remember that freight forwarders are required to clear customs when both leaving the customer's country and when entering the United States which would have added even more to the pipeline time. Customers should generally expect it to take about two or three months for their requisitions to be H-coded unless they choose to ship the carcasses by priority air.

Our research showed that there are many things that can delay H-coding and practically all of them result from the customer not properly following the requisitioning and

shipping procedures prescribed in AFM 67-1. When shipping procedures are not followed, carcasses can easily be misrouted or even lost because of the lack of visibility of the reparable assets from the time the customer ships them until they are H-coded. Also, when a carcass arrives at the wrong TRC, the ALCs do not help matters by forwarding the parts to the correct repair center without ensuring that they are identifiable as FMS returns. Delays could be caused by not properly requesting repairs, too. For example, if a customer initiated a requisition for an item that was not included on the MRRL, then when the carcass arrived and a receipt transaction was entered into the computer, there would not be a match between the D6E and the MRRL and, therefore, SAMIS would not H-code that requisition.

Although there are many reasons for possible delays, there was some indication that such problems did not occur very often in our data sample. Considering the full data set, 25 out of 656 requisitions, less than four percent, took over a year to get H-coded. Taking a year or more to get a requisition H-coded is excessive by any standards but, since we could not tell how long it took after arrival of the carcass at the correct repair center, those requisitions were presumably problem cases such as we have discussed that may have been misrouted or lost. However, only 106 requisitions (16 percent) took more than three months. Whereas these numbers may not have reflected a severe

that problems exist even though the general feeling among USAF personnel has been that H-coding was accomplished automatically except in rare cases. A possible explanation for this misperception is that, it may be an automatic process once SAMIS verifies the match between the D6E receipt transaction and the MRRL suspense transaction, but there are many opportunities for problems to occur that are not obvious to USAF personnel before the carcass arrives at the ALC and falls under the direct control of the USAF. The effect-cause-effect diagram in chapter four illustrated this point.

While the data clearly indicated a difference between the way programmed and non-programmed requisitions are treated, this difference was statistically significant only and each customer must weigh for themselves how valid the differences are for their individual concerns. While the data showed clearly that programmed requisitions were filled more quickly, the average time saved was 35 days compared to a non-programmed demand. It may not be worth it for some customers to pay for the difference, even though they may want to invest in greater in-country inventories. For example, some customers may be perfectly willing to wait longer for requisitions to be returned as a trade off of not having to invest heavily into the CLSSA programs. This benefit of added financial resources could far offset a country's need for rapid response times.

This thesis was not meant to focus on the quality of customer service provided by FMS. However, while examining the various aspects of the replacement requisition process. it became obvious that some of the difficulties typically experienced by FMS clients were directly related to procedures in the system that were designed to protect U.S. interests with little regard for the ensuing effect on customer support. For example, customers are required to return their reparable carcasses and have them formally documented as having been "received" at the appropriate technical repair center before their requisitions are recognized by the USAF. This is not the case for USAF requisitions. A USAF requisition is initiated by the customer who informs the supply activity of the requirement. Supply, in turn, either fills the requisition from assets on hand or passes the demand requirement on to be worked by the appropriate logistics agency. While Supply addresses the customer's demand, the unserviceable part is simply considered to be owed to Supply or "due-in from maintenance." It is a case of Supply coming to the USAF and of FMS having to go to Supply.

Similarly, it may be difficult for a customer to understand why the money they paid into a CLSSA case is not good enough to cover the initial maintenance costs involved in repairing spares. How could they be adequately convinced that, although their money is already under the control of the Security Assistance Accounting Center to cover the

maintenance, they should wait for DPEM funds to become available to cover the costs? It is understandable why the customer does not always perceive the USAF to be very customer oriented!

However, since April 1991, there has been a major effort on the part of the USAF to improve the support for FMS customers. Many of the policy changes specifically targeted problems associated with getting requisitions Hcoded. Proposed changes in funding would also make the process move along more smoothly for the customer while providing the added benefit for the USAF of having more DPEM funds available for its own use. The USAF saw the importance of having well-supported allies during the Persian Gulf War and the extra attention given to FMS programs is an indication of this. A more recent consideration may also be that, if the U.S. wants to continue to reduce its weapon system production costs by improving economies of scale through FMS sales, it will have to be more competitive with the military hardware being made available by other countries, most notably those emerging nations from the former Soviet Union.

Ultimately, our research has statistically proven what we knew all along—the FMS reparable pipeline is not a perfect system. Customers that use the repair and replace program find that it can take a long time to obtain the serviceable assets they need, but the pipeline times are reasonable considering the process involved. Although some

customers feel there are problems inherent in the system,
the USAF has recognized many of the problems and is actively
pursuing solutions which would benefit all parties.

#### Recommendations

Although the data evaluated indicated that the majority of FMS customer assets move from the customer's country into a USAF repair facility and receive an H-code in an acceptable time period, this phase of the pipeline still has vast room for improvement. When a USAF unit needs a part repaired, the unit initiates a requisition and the ALCs begin processing the request before the carcass leaves base. This is not the case for our FMS customers. When an FMS customer needs a replacement part, the customer sends the ALC an advanced copy of the requisition but the ALC does not initiate processing the requisition until the carcass actually arrives at the ALC. In this day of electronic media, such as Fax machines and computer modems which are readily accessible to customers who can afford weapon systems such as the F-16, there is no reason that an FMS customer cannot notify an ALC of a requisition virtually immediately upon the identification of a need, much the same way that the USAF units operate now. If the ALCs would begin processing these requests when received rather than requiring the carcass to be on hand first, this alone would reduce the pipeline greatly. Our data by itself indicates such a policy could remove two to three months from the

pipeline for most requisitions. Our research has not uncovered any reason to prevent such a policy from being enacted. Furthermore, in our discussions of this concept with ILC logistics specialists, no one could provide any justification of why the USAF had to have a carcass in hand before beginning to process a repair and replace requisition for an FMS customer. Some possible reasons provided were that not every country had the technology to process the requisitions electronically or that this concept may result in the USAF being placed in a position to credit an FMS case because if the USAF were to ship an asset before receiving a carcass it would charge full value and then have to credit the customer when the carcass was received. This credit idea was not well received in the ILC, but again we are not aware of any reason why this could not be made to work effectively.

Another recommendation would be for the USAF to emphasize the importance of customer training and familiarization with applicable regulations, particularly those involving the detailed requisitioning, packaging, and shipping procedures. Since many of the worst problems such as lost or misrouted carcasses could be avoided by properly following USAF procedures, this recommendation would probably best be considered as teaching the customer preventive maintenance.

To validate our findings and recommendations, we suggest that further research be conducted involving other

weapon systems' pipelines in which FMS customers extensively use the repair and replace program. One particular area of interest would involve a contrast of our data, or similar data, on FMS replacement requisitions to comparable requisitions from the USAF to determine any differences. Continued research in this area could enhance the future level of support provided to U.S. allies.

# APPENDIX A: GLOSSARY OF TERMS (1)

AIR LOGISTICS CENTER (ALC) - One of five Air Force inventory control points which normally will fill FMS requisitions.

BLANKET ORDER CASE - A case established for a category of items or services with no definitive listing of specific items or quantities. The case specifies a dollar ceiling against which the purchaser may place orders.

CASE - A contractual sales agreement between the U.S. and an eligible foreign country or international organization documented by a DD Form 1513. One FMS case designator is assigned, for the purpose of identification, accounting, and data processing for each accepted offer (DD Form 1513).

COMMERCIAL SALE - Sale made by U.S. industry directly to a foreign buyer which is not administered by the DOD through FMS procedures.

COOPERATIVE LOGISTICS SUPPLY SUPPORT ARRANGEMENTS (CLSSA) - Peacetime military logistics support arrangements designed to provide responsive and continuous supply support at the depot level for U.S.- made military material possessed by foreign countries and international organizations. The CLSSA is normally the most effective means for providing

common repair parts and secondary item support for equipment of U.S. origin which is in allied and friendly country inventories.

DEFINED ORDER CASE - A case used to purchase specific quantities of individually defined goods or services.

ELIGIBLE RECIPIENT (FMS) — Any friendly foreign country or international organization determined by the President to be eligible to purchase defense articles and defense services, unless otherwise ineligible due to statutory restrictions.

ELIGIBLE-TO-BE-PROGRAMMED-QUANTITY (EPQ) - That portion of a FMSO I investment item stock level quantity that is available for coding a FMSO II requisition as a programmed demand. If the FMSO II requisition quantity is greater than the EPQ, the requisition is coded as non-programmed. FMS CASE - A DD Form 1513, "United States Department of Defense Offer and Acceptance," which has been accepted by a foreign country.

FOREIGN LIAISON OFFICER (FLO) — An official representative, either military or civilian, of a foreign government or international organization, stationed in the U.S. normally for the purpose of managing or monitoring security assistance programs.

FOREIGN MILITARY SALES (FMS) - that portion of U.S. security assistance authorized by the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, and conducted on the basis of formal contracts or agreements between the USG and an authorized recipient government or international organization. FMS includes government-to-government sale of defense articles or defense services, from DOD stocks or through purchase under DOD-managed contracts, m regardless of the source of financing.

FOREIGN MILITARY SALES ORDER NO. I (FMSO I) - Provides for pipeline capitalization of a cooperative logistics support arrangement, which consists of stocks on hand and replenishment of stocks on order in which the participating country buys equity in the U.S. supply system for support of a specific weapon system. Even though stocks are not moved to a foreign country, delivery (equity) does in effect take place when the country pays for the case.

FOREIGN MILITARY SALES ORDER NO. II (FMSO II) - The CLSSA case used for requisitioning spares (2:viii).

FREIGHT FORWARDER (FF) - The agent designated by the purchaser to complete or control FMS material shipment from CONUS or third countries to the purchaser's designation.

This is usually a licensed international broker or freight forwarding agent.

H-CODE - A replacement requisition with an "H" in position

40 automatically generated by SAMIS when the D6E transaction

matches up with a MRRL suspense transaction. Identifies

requisition to belong to an FMS customer (1:11.5).

INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS CENTER (ILC) - The AFLC organization responsible for providing logistics support to FMS customers through the USAF SA program.

LEAD TIME (FMS) - Generally refers to the amount of time required to negotiate an agreement, place an item on contract and deliver the item to the customer.

LETTER OF OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE (LOA) - U.S. DOD Form 1513 offer and Acceptance by which the USG offers to sell to a foreign government or international organization defense articles and defense services pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act, as amended. The DD Form 1513 lists the items and/or services, estimated costs, the terms and conditions of sale, and provides for the foreign government's signature to indicate acceptance.

MATERIAL REPAIR/REQUIREMENTS LIST (MRRL) - An FMS customers' list of repair requirements for assets covered under a current CLSSA FMSO II case. Requires approval for repair by USAF based on availability of a valid repair source (7:14.70).

MILITARY EXPORT SALES - All sales of defense articles and defense services made from U.S. sources to foreign governments, foreign private firms and international organizations, whether made by DOD or by U.S. industry directly to a foreign buyer. Such sales fall into two major categories: Foreign Military Sales and Commercial Sales.

NON-PROGRAMMED DEMAND - A status assigned to a FMSO II requisition to indicate that on-hand/on-order depot assets will not normally be used to fill the requisition. Unless the asset position is above the control level, the requisition quantity will be backordered lead time away.

NONSTANDARD ITEM PARTS AND REPAIR SUPPORT (NIPARS) — A contractual arrangement between the ILC and a contractor wherein the contractor provides a purchasing system to fill nonstandard item supply and repair/return requisitions.

Items covered under this contract include those never used by DOD (i.e., a country-unique configuration), those no longer used by DOD (i.e., a deactivated system), and commercial items with military application.

PROGRAMMED DEMAND - Demand (requisition) for an item for which a CLSSA stock level forecast has been incorporated into the applicable requirements computation for a sufficient period of time that depot stocks have been

increased in anticipation of the demand. Programmed demands are given access to on-hand/on-order depot stocks.

REPARABLES - Items not consumed in use; that is, they can be reconditioned or economically repaired when they become

unserviceable (9:80).

SECURITY ASSISTANCE (SA) - A group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the U.S. provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, by grant loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM (SAMIS) The computer system used for FMS management and requisition routing and control.

SPARES - Those support items that are an integral part of the end item or system which are coded as reparable.

WEAPON SYSTEM - A delivery vehicle and weapon combination including all related equipment, materials, services and personnel required so that the system becomes self-sufficient in its intended operational environment.

# APPENDIX B: FLO INTERVIEW PROCESS

Give FLO a quick briefing on what we're doing and why their opinions are important to us.

Get a general background of what the FLO's military experience is.

1. What are your perceptions of the FMS program in general as a customer?

As an FMS customer, do you feel you are treated fairly by the program?

- 2. Does your country use the repair/replace program?
- 3. Are you satisfied with the way in which the repair/replace program operates?
- 4. Are there cases that you are aware of involving parts that were delayed excessively or lost?

What was the explanation for the delay/loss?

Details and part numbers if available...?

- 5. Are there particular aircraft that receive better service than others through FMS?
- 6. Are there some depots (ALCs) that provide better service than others?

Why do you think so?

7. If you could make any changes, what would you change about FMS and the repair/replace program in particular?

# APPENDIX C: REPAIR AND REPLACE DATA FOR FMS F-16

								Cust	H-coded	Cust	Cust	Diff
			Shipped		Proj.	Shipper	1	to	till	till	till	btwn
	Nomenclature		to USAF		Ship	to		H-code	ship	proj	actual	proj &
line	C	Counti	<b>`</b> y	H-coded	date	Cust	Pro	9		ship	ship	ac tua l
1		BA	1272	1325	2323	2016	N	53	56	416	109	307
	CIRCUIT CARD AS	BA	1315	2028	2029	2031	N	78	3	79	81	-2
	CIRCUIT CARD AS	BA	1092	1303	2151	2121	N	211	183	424	394	30
	CONTROL UNIT, F	BA	2060	2099	3095	2122	N	39	23	400	62	338
	CONTROLLER, FLI	BA	1315	2027	3023	2034	N	77	7	438	84	354
	CONVERTER, SIGN	BA	1198	1276	5032	2016	N	78	105	1294	183	1111
	NOISE REGULATOR	BA	1315	2027	4240	2031	N	77	4	1020	81	939
	POWER SUPPLY	BA	1294	2035	4309	2041	N	106	6	1110	112	998
	POWER SUPPLY	BA	1272	1325	4082	1361	N	53	36	905	89	816
	TRANSMITTER, AN	BA	2004	2050	3293	2139	N	46	89	654	135	519
	CIRCUIT CARD AS	BE	1212	1275	4031	2107		63		914	260	654
	CIRCUIT CARD AS	BE	9299	1179	3271	2091	N	610	277	1432	887	545
	CIRCUIT CARD AS	BE	1051	1086	3206	2037	N	35	316	885	351	534
	CIRCUIT CARD AS	BE	1002	2098	4191	2129	N	461	31	1284	492	792
	TRANSDUCER, MOT	BE	2106	2155	2156	2160	N	49	5	50	54	-4
	CONTROLLER BOAR	DE	1311	1331	5056	2062		20	96	1205	116	1089
	UNIT, RATE SENS	DE	1350	2027	3342	2093	N	42		722	108	614
18		E6	1309	2027	3023	2031	N	83		444	87	357
	ACTUATOR, ELECT	<b>E6</b>	1004	1101	4166	2017	N	97		1257	378	879
	ANTENNA	<b>EG</b>	1076	1211	2332	2036	N	135	190	621	325	296
	ASYMMETRYBRAKE,	E6	1338	2070	4161	2072	N	97	2	918	99	184
	ASYMMETRYBRAKE,	E6	1308	2027	4118	2031	N	84	4	905	88	817
	CIRCUIT CARD AS	EG	2104	2154	3150	2157	N	50	_	411	53	358
	CIRCUIT CARD AS	EG	2054	2113	4117	2121	N	59		793	67	726
	CIRCUIT CARD AS	E6	2021	2078	3075	2112		57		419	91	328
	CIRCUIT CARD AS	EG	2025	2078	2125	2127	N	53		100	102	-2
	CIRCUIT CARD AS	<b>E6</b>	2001	2070	2364	2121	N	69	51	363	120	243
	CIRCUIT CARD AS	EG	2001	2070	4161	2084	N	69	14	890	83	807
	CIRCUIT CARD AS	<b>E6</b>	2001	2070	3252	2121	N	69	51	616	120	496
	CIRCUIT CARD AS	EG	1317	2055	4146	2098	N	103		924	146	778
	CIRCUIT CARD AS	EG	1317	2055	4146	2098	N	103		924	146	778
	CIRCUIT CARD AS	EG	1317	2055	4146	2098	N	103	43	924	146	778
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		1317	2055	4146	2097	N	103	42	924	145	779
	CIRCUIT CARD AS	EG	1329	2041	3037	2043		77	2	438	79	359
	CIRCUIT CARD AS	E6	1310	2027	3023	2057		82	30	443	112	331
	CIRCUIT CARD AS	EG	1217	1295	2293	2002		78	72	441	150	291
	CIRCUIT CARD AS	EG	9119	1261	3352	2065	N	872	169	1693	1041	652
	CIRCUIT CARD AS	E6	9117	1261	3352	2065	N	872	169	1693	1041	652
	CIRCUIT CARD AS	<b>E6</b>	1142	1235	4113	2045	N	93	175	1066	268	798
	CIRCUIT CARD AS	£6	1113	1210	3026	2045	N	<del>9</del> 7	200	643	297	346
	COMPUTER, AIR D	EG	1335	2041	3037	2045	N	71	4	432	75	357
	CONTROL UNIT, F	E6	203	304	1301	2008		101	434	463	535	-72
43	DISPLAY UNIT, H	EG	1142	1263	2354	2034	N	121	136	577	257	320

REPAIR AND REPLACE DATA FOR FMS F-16

								Cust	H-coded	Cust	Cust	Diff
			Shipped		Proj.	Shipper	d	to	till	till	till	btwn
	Nomenclature		to USAF		Ship	to		H-code	ship	tonq	actual	proj &
line	(	Count	ry	H-coded	date	Cust	Pro	g		ship	ship	actual
	ELECTRONIC COMP	E6	1309	2027	4179	2038	N	83		965	94	871
	EPROM BOARD	E6	1322	2042	4073	2121	N	85	<del>79</del>	846	164	682
	INTERFACE UNIT,	E6	2042	2113	4144	2139		71	26	832	97	735
	INTERFACE UNIT,	<b>E6</b>	2042	2111	4141	2139	N	69	28	829	97	732
	INTERFACE UNIT,	E6	2042	2111	4141	2141	N	69	30	829	99	730
	INTERFACE UNIT,	E6	2042	2111	4141	2141	N	69	30	829	99	730
	INTERFACE UNIT,	E6	2042	2097	4127	2141	N	55	44	815	99	716
	INTERFACE UNIT,	E6	2042	2097	4127	2141	N	55	44	815	99	716
	INTERFACE UNIT,	E6	2042	2097	4127	2140		55	43	815	98	717
	INTERFACE UNIT, INTERFACE UNIT,	E6	2042	2097	4127	2140	N	55	43	815	98	717
	MULTIPLIER, ELE	E6	2042	2097 2041	4127	2140	N N	55 77	43	815	98	717
	PANEL, POWER DI		1329 64	243	3345	2055			_	746	91	655
	PANEL, POWERDIS		1239	1325	2213 4236	2113 2082	N	179 86	600 122	879	779	100
	POWER SUPPLY	E6	1335	2041	3037	2154		71	113	1092 432	208 184	884 248
	POWER SUPPLY	EG	1295	2027	3023	2143		97		458	213	245
	POWER SUPPLY	E6	1308	2013	3009	2154		70	141	431	213	220
	POMER SUPPLY	£6	1167	1266	2269	2153		99	252	467	351	116
	POWER SUPPLY	E6	1127	1210	2208	2154		83		446	392	54
	POWER SUPPLY	E6	1070	1200	2205	2154		130		500	449	51
	POWER SUPPLY	E6	1062	1172	2177	2126	N	110		480	429	51
	PRINTED CIRCUIT	E6	1338	2070	3066	2098	N	97		458	125	-302
	SIGHT, HUD	E6	2105	2154	4184	2157		49	3	809	52	757
	TRANSFER UNIT	E6	2021	2078	2111	2113		57		90	92	2
	TUBE UNIT ASSY	£6	1222	1295	2293	2002	N	73		436	145	291
	TUBE UNIT ASSY	EG	1222	1295	2293	2013		73		436	156	280
	TUBE UNIT ASSY	E6	1218	1268	2271	2001	N	50		418	148	270
71	TUBE UNIT ASSY	E6	1189	1266	2269	2013	N	77		445	189	256
72	TUBE UNIT ASSY	<b>E6</b>	1189	1266	2269	2002		77		445	178	267
73	TUBE UNIT ASSY	<b>E6</b>	1189	1266	2269	1361	N	77		445	172	273
74	TUBE UNIT ASSY	EG	1189	1266	2269	2014	N	77	113	445	190	255
75	TUBE UNIT ASSY	<b>E6</b>	1118	1235	2238	2010	N	117	140	485	257	228
76	TUBE UNIT ASSY	E6	1118	1235	2238	2010	N	117	140	485	257	228
77	TUBE UNIT ASSY	<b>E6</b>	1118	1235	2238	2010	N	117	140	485	257	228
78	TUBE UNIT ASSY	<b>E6</b>	1118	1235	2238	2010	N	117	140	485	257	228
79	VALVE ASSY	E6	2103	2149	5240	2155	N	46	6	1232	52	1180
	VALVE ASSY	E6	2001	2070	5161	2077	N	69	7	1255	76	1179
81	VALVE, REGULATI		253	1268	4054	2044	N	380	141	1261	521	740
	VALVE, REGULATI		1197	1267	2271	2343	N	70	441	439	511	-72
83		GR	1162	1191	1273	1281	N	29	90	111	119	-8
84		6R	1128	1159	1339			31	278	211	309	-98
	ACTUATOR, ELECT	GR	1296	1331	2329	2162		35	196	398	231	167
86	ACTUATOR, ELECT	SR	1296	1331	2329	2070	N	35	104	398	139	259

REPAIR AND REPLACE DATA FOR FMS F-16

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			•			<b>.</b> .		Cust	H-coded		Cust	Diff
			probeq	1	roj.	Shipped	1	to	till	till	till	btwn
	Nomenclature		to USAF		Ship	to		H-code	ship	proj	actual	brol 🖁
line	1	Country	/ t	l-coded	date	Cust	Pro	9		ship	ship	actual
	CARD ASSEMBLY,	SR	1115	1140	2293	2018	N	25	243	543	268	275
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2049	2078	4048	2112	N	29	34	72 <del>9</del>	63	666
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2049	2078	4048	2112	N	29	34	729	63	666
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2010	2063	4215	2101	N	53	38	935	91	844
	CIRCUIT CARD AS	-	2035	2057	3363	2091	N	22	34	693	56	637
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2024	2057	3363	2091	N	33	34	704	67	637
93	CIRCUIT CARD AS	GR	2010	2036	3033	2062	N	26	26	388	52	336
94	CIRCUIT CARD AS	GR	2010	2036	4090	2112	N	26	76	810	102	708
95	CIRCUIT CARD AS	GR	1308	1361	2358	2127	N	53	131	415	184	231
96	CIRCUIT CARD AS	GR	1260	1296	3266	1361	N	36	65	736	101	635
97	CIRCUIT CARD AS	GR	1189	1210	2207	1362	N	21	152	383	173	210
98	CIRCUIT CARD AS	GR	1189	1210	2362	2084	N	21	239	538	260	278
99	CIRCUIT CARD AS	GR	1189	1210	4149	2045	N	21	200	1055	221	834
100	CIRCUIT CARD AS	GR.	1128	1162	2160	2162	N	34	365	397	399	-2
	CIRCUIT CARD AS	_	1025	1050	2048	2044	N	25	359	388	384	4
	COMPENSATOR	GR	2016	2036	4250	2043	N	20	7	964	27	937
	CONTROL UNIT, F		2031	2057	3055	2065	N	26	8	389	34	355
	DISPLAY HEAD AS		1092	1168	3170	1361	N	76	193	808	269	539
	ELECTRONIC COMP	GR.	2066	2086	4241	2094	N	20	8	905	28	977
	ELECTRONIC COMP	GR	1179	1210	2208	2002	N	31	157	394	188	206
	POWER SUPPLY	GR	1176	1281	4037	1361	N	105	80	956	185	771
	POWER SUPPLY	GR	1128	1159	2158	2126	N	31	332	395	363	32
	POMER SUPPLY	GR	1085	1130	2130	2119	N	45	352 354			
	POWER SUPPLY	GR	1085	1130	2130	2117		45		. 410	399	11
	PRINTED CIRCUIT		2134	2160			N		355	410	400	10
	PRINTED CIRCUIT				3157	2167	N	26	7	388	33	355
	PRINTED CIRCUIT		2134	2160	3157	2167	N	26	7	388	22	355
			2134	2160	3157	2167	N	26	7	388	33	355
	PLATFORM, INERT		1284	2064	2156	2094	N	145	30	237	175	62
	PLATFORM, INERT		1284	2064	2156	2070	N	145	6	237	151	86
	ACTUATOR INSTAL	KS	1086	1155	2152	2052	N	69	262	431	331	100
	ACTUATOR INSTAL	KS	1086	1155	2152	2050	N	69	260	431	329	102
	ACTUATOR INSTAL	KS	1086	1155	2152	2050	N	69	260	431	329	102
	ACTUATOR, ELECT		1281	1345	2342		N	64	182	426	246	180
	ACTUATOR, ELECT		1094	1155	2152	2050	N	61	260	423	321	102
	ANTENNA	KS	1199	1259	3045	2042	N	60	148	576	208	368
	ANTENNA	KS	1066	1122	2243	2030	N	56	273	542	329	213
	CABLE ASSEMBLY,	KS	8349	9003	9017	2051	N	19	1143	33	1162	-2129
	CARD ASSY, PROG		299	1011	2166	2133	N	77	487	597	564	33
	CARD ASSY, PROG		299	1011	2166	2133	N	77	487	597	564	33
	CARD ASSY, PROG	KS	299	1011	2166	2133	N	77	487	597	564	33
	CARD ASSY, PROG		320	1011	2166	2139	N	56	493	576	549	27
	CENTRAL PROCESS		2048	2113	3110	2121	N	65	8	427	73	354
129	CIRCUIT CARD AS	KS	2048	2114	2119	2121	N	66	7	71	73	-2

# REPAIR AND REPLACE DATA FOR FMS F-16

								Cust	H-coded	Cust	Cust	Diff
			ipped		Proj.	Shippe	đ	to	till	till	till	btwn
	Nomenclature		USAF		Ship	to		H-code	ship	proj	actual	proj &
line	Į.	Country		H-coded	date	Cust	Pro	9		ship	ship	actual
	<b>615</b>											
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2048	2114	2119	2121	N	66	7	71	73	-2
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2048	2114	2119	2121	N	66	7	71	73	-2
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2048	2114	2119	2121	N	66	7	71	73	-2
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2048	2114	5057	2154	N	66	40	1104	106	998
	CIRCUIT CARD AS	KS	166	2099	4192	2111	N	663	12	1486	675	811
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2027	2097	2104	2105	N	70	8	77	78	-1
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2041	2097	2105	2111	N	56	14	64	70	-6
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2027	2093	3090	2147	N	66	54	428	120	308
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2021	2086	3085	2114	N	65	28	429	93	336
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		1253	1350	3319	2087	N	97	102	796	199	597
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		1199	1259	3228	1360	N	60	101	759	161	598
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		1169	1246	1247	2029	N	77	148	78	225	-147
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		1169	1246	4185	2017	N	77	136	1111	213	898
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		1169	1246	4185	2017	N	77	136	1111	213	898
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		1169	1246	4276	2045	N	77	164	1202	241	961
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		182	1246	4154	2034	N	64	153	1067	217	850
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		1169	1246	1365	2105	N	77	224	196	301	-105
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		086	1155	2152	1354	N	69	199	431	268	163
	CIRCUIT CARD AS	KS	303	1032	2336	1360	N	94	320	763	422	341
	CIRCUIT CARD AS	KS	295	1011	4014	2045	N	81	399	1179	480	699
	CONVERTER, PRES		2048	2114	5057	2129	N	66	15`	1104	81	1023
	CORE MEMORY UNI		037	2093	2094	2098	N	56	5	57	61	-4
	CORE MEMORY UNI	KS	233	1311	2308	2065	N	443	119	805	562	243
	CORE MEMORY UNI	KS	233	1311	2308	2065	N	443	119	805	562	243
	CORE MEMORY UNI	KS	233	1311	2308	2002	N	443	56	805	499	306
	CORE MEMORY UNI		231	1304	2302	2008	N	73	69	436	142	294
	CORE MEMORY UNI		231	1284	2281	2065	N	53	146	415	199	216
	DIGITAL MODULE		231	1284	2281	2065	N	53	146	415	199	216
	DUPLEXER AND WA		048	2113	5083	2120	N	65	7	1130	72	1058
	ELECTRONIC COMP		037	2093	4157	2111	N	56	18	850	74	776
	ELECTRONIC COMP		048	2114	2119	2121	N	66	7	71	73	-2
	ELECTRONIC COMP		152	1276 330	2279	2153	N	124	242	492	366	126
	PANEL, POMERDIS		261		2026	2052	N	69	452	495	521	-26
	POWER SUPPLY		152	1276	4032	2080	N	124	169	975	293	682
	POWER SUPPLY		048 048	2133	2134	2142	N	85	9	86	94	-8
	POMER SUPPLY		048	2114	2119	2121	N	66	7	71	73	-2
	POMER SUPPLY		048	2114	2119	2125	N	66	11	71	77	-6
	POWER SUPPLY		048	2114	2119	2125	N	66	11	71	77	-6
	POMER SUPPLY		048	2114	2119	2121	N	66	7	71	73	-2
	POMER SUPPLY		048	2114	2119	2125	N	66	11	71	77	-6
	POMER SUPPLY		048	2114	2119	2121	N	66	7	71	73	-2
	POMER SUPPLY		027	2114	4209 5074	2129	N	66	15	891	81	810
4/4	SHEN SHIFLE	NO 2	VZ/	2093	5036	2107	N	66	14	1104	80	1024

REPAIR AND REPLACE DATA FOR FMS F-16

	INC. HER IND THE BUILD OF THE								H-coded	Cust	Cust	Diff
			Shipped	F	roj.	Shipped	ı	to	till	till	till	btwn
	Nomenclature		to USAF		Ship	to		H-code	ship	proj	actual	proj &
line	1	Countr	·y ·	H-coded	date	Cust	Prog	}		ship	ship	actual
											~	
	POMER SUPPLY	KS	2037	2056	2058	2062	N	19	6	21	25	-4 701
	POWER SUPPLY	KS	1268	1340	2337	2016	N	72	41	434	113	321 321
	POWER SUPPLY	KS	1268	1340	2337	2016	N	72	41 22	434 1322	113 493	321 829
	POWER SUPPLY	KS	233	1339	4095	1361	N N	471 51	63	413	114	299
	POWER SUPPLY	KS	1268	1319 1247	2316 3338	2017 1364	N	78		899	195	70 <b>4</b>
	POWER SUPPLY POWER SUPPLY	KS KS	1169 1169	1247	3337	1364	N	77		898	195	703
-	POWER SUPPLY	KS	1053	1115	2112	2125	N	62		424	437	-13
	POWER SUPPLY	KS	1033	1100	2101	2121	N	72		438		-20
	POWER SUPPLY	KS	1028	1098	2101	2126	N	70		438	463	-25
	PRINTED CIRCUIT		2055	2113	2118	2120		58		63		-2
	RACK, ELCETRICA		1196	1266	3144	2101	N	70		<i>6</i> 78		408
	RECEIVER, RADAR		2027	2097	2105	2106	N	70		78	79	-1
	TUBE UNIT ASSY	KS	1018	2127	4158	2139		474	-	1235	486	749
	TUBE UNIT ASSY	K5	74	133	1135	2139		59		426	795	-369
	TUBE UNIT ASSY		74	133	1135	2133		59		426		-363
189	•	NE	52	201	3110			149		1153		377
190		NE	52	201	3110			149		1153		361
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		175	180	2031	2073		5	623	586	628	-42
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		62	87	1301	2009		25		604	677	-73
	CONVERTER, PRES		2065	2090	4364			25	9	1029	34	995
	MESSAGE UNIT, V		329	1011	3014	2065	N	47	419	780	466	314
	VALVE, REGULAT		328	1107	3229	2009	N	144	267	996	411	585
	VIN FIN ASSY	NE	1230	1284	3074	2008	N	54	89	574	143	431
197	CONVERTER, PRE	s sr	2049	2084	4085	2098	N	35	14	766	49	717
198	SIGHT, HUD	SR	1298	1350	4289	2029	N	52	2 44	1086	96	990
199	ACTUATOR, ELEC	T TH	1193	1238	2237	2058	N	45	185	409	230	179
200	CIRCUIT CARD A	S TH	2009	2093	2106	2114	N	84	21	97	105	-8
201	CIRCUIT CARD A	S TH	1213	2027	2279	2043	N	179	7 16	431	195	236
202	CIRCUIT CARD A	S TH	1213	1268	1294	1298	N	55		81		-4
203	CIRCUIT CARD A	S TH	1213	1268	2271			5		423		
204	POWER SUPPLY	TH	1063	1133	2131			70		433		101
	VALVE, SOLENOI		1276		3264			23		718		480
	BACKPLANE ASSY		1304		4032			54		823		
	BLANKER, INTER		2029		3067			4:		403		
	BLANKER, INTER		1304		2364			54		425		
	BLANKER, INTER		1304		2364			54		425		
	CIRCUIT CARD A		2058		3096			4:		403		
	CIRCUIT CARD A		2029		3075			4		411		
	CIRCUIT CARD A		2029		4162			4:		863		808
	S CIRCUIT CARD A		2008		3065			5		42		
	CIRCUIT CARD A		2008		4285			3		1007		
213	S CIRCUIT CARD A	IS TK	2008	2041	3365	2108	B N	3	3 67	72.	2 100	622

REPAIR AND REPLACE DATA FOR FMS F-16

								Cust	H-coded	Cust	Cust	Diff
			Shipped	<b>l</b> i	Proj.	Shippe	đ	to	till	till	till	btwn
	Nomenclature		to USAF	•	Ship	to		H-code	ship	proj	actual	proj &
line	(	Count	гу	H-coded	date	Cust	Pro	g		ship	ship	actual
_												
	CIRCUIT CARD AS	TK	1338	2027	3024	2031	N	54	4	416	58	358
	CIRCUIT CARD AS	TK	1304	1358	2220	2010		54		281	71	210
	CIRCUIT CARD AS	TK	1304	1358	3304	2057		54		730	118	612
	CIRCUIT CARD AS	TK	1304	1358	3304	2108		54		730	169	561
	CIRCUIT CARD AS	TK	307	1347	4228	2017		405	35	1381	440	941
	CIRCUIT CARD AS	TK	1035	1095	1149	1364		60		114	329	-215
	CIRCUIT CARD AS	TK	1188	1225	2074	2142		37	282	251	319	-68
	CIRCUIT CARD AS	TK	2120	2155	4033	2170		35	15	643	50	593
	COMPUTER, FIRE	TK	2029	2090	3086	2142		61	52	422	113	309
	COMPUTER, FIRE	TK	1338	2066	3062	2080		93		454	107	347
	COMPUTER, FIRE	TK	1151	1303	2300	2014		152		514	228	286
	COMPUTER, FIRE	TK	1188	1260	1261	2009		72		73	186	-113
	CONTROL, UNIT-6		1338	2027	4119	2041	N	54	14	876	68	808
	CONTROLLER, FLT	TK	2029	2070	3066	2107		41	37	402	78	324
	CONTROLLER, FLT		2008	2041	3038	2062		33		395	54	341
	CONTROLLER, FLT		1304	2006	3003	2034		67		429	95	334
	CONTROLLER, FLT		1304	2006	3003	2037		67 770		429	98	331
	CONVERTER, SIGN		307	1281	5037	2038		339		1555	461	1094
	CORE MEMORY UNI	TK	2029	2071	3067	2084		42		403	55 5.4	348 75.4
	CORE MEMORY UNI	TK	2008	2055	3051	2062		47		408	54	354
	DATA ENTRY DISP	TK	1245	1284	4289	2031		39		1139	151	988
	DATA ENTRY DISP ELECTRONIC COMP	TK	1245	1284	4289	2098		39		1139	218	921
	ELECTRONIC COMP	TK	1151	1210	2207	2153		59 31		421	367	54 190
	ELECTRONIC COMP	TK	1151	1182	2186	2006				400	220	180
	ELECTRONIC COMP	TK	2008	2041	5133	2056		33		1220	48	1172
	ELECTRONIC COMP	TK TK	205 1211	304 1246	4030 2252	2034 2006		99 35		1285 406	559	726 246
	HOLDER, PRINTED		1338	2027	2060	2008		54		87	160 58	2 <del>40</del> 29
	INTERCONNECTING		1220	92	1090			54		417	735	-318
	INTERFACE UNIT.		307	1269	1337	2073		327		395	444	-49
	MESSAGE UNIT, V		347	1039	3039	2043		57		787	426	361
	NOISE REGULATOR	TK	155	1352	4235	2024		562		1540	599	941
	NOISE REGULATOR		1188	1226	4074	2050		38		981	227	754
	NOISE REGULATOR		1188	1225	2074			37		251	227	24
	PANEL, POWER DI	TK	2008	2041	2243			33		235	74	161
	POWER SUPPLY	TK	2058	2090	4364	2194		32		1036	136	900
	POWER SUPPLY	TK	1304	1358	4093			54		884	69	815
	POWER SUPPLY	TK	1188	1225	2074	2006		37		251	183	68
	POWER SUPPLY	TK	1178	1225	2261	2024		47		448	211	237
	POWER SUPPLY	TK	1122	1155	2158	2118		33		401	361	40
	POWER SUPPLY S-	TK	1304	1358	2364	2014		54		425	75	350
	POMER SUPPLY-RE		1211	1233	4172			22		1056	182	874
	PRESSURIZING SE		2008	2041	3038	2085		33		395	77	318
		***	2440			-400	•	-	71	5,5	• • •	210

REPAIR AND REPLACE DATA FOR FMS F-16

								Cust	H-coded	Cust	Cust	Diff
			hipped		Proj.	Shipper	Í	to	till	till	till	btwn
	Nomenclature		o USAF		Ship	to	_	H-code	ship	bLO1	actual	proj Ł
line	(	Country		H-coded	date	Cust	Pro	9		ship	ship	actual
250	PRINTED CIRCUIT	TK	2008	2041	3038	2091	N	33	50	395	83	312
	PWR SUPPLY, S-A	TK	2088	2125	3121	2128	N	33 37	3	398	40	312 358
	PWR SUPPLY, S-A	TK	1338	2027	3024	2035	N	54	8	416	62	354
	SIGHT, HUD	TK	2088	2125	5064	2128	N	37	3	1071	40	1031
	SIGHT, HUD	TK	1338	2027	4302	2042	N	54	15	1059	69	990
	SIGHT, HUD	TK	1338	2027	4302	2038	N	54	11	1059	65	994
	SIGHT, HUD	TK	1188	1225	2074	2065	N	37	205	251	242	9
	TRANSMITTER, AN	TK	2008	2041	3285	2139	N	33	98	642	131	511
	TUBE UNIT ASSY	TK	2008	2057	4088	2107	N	49	50	810	99	711
	TUBE UNIT ASSY	TK	1188	1225	2261	2017	N	37	157	438	194	244
	VIN FIN ASSY	TK	1123	1155	2276	2059	N	32	269	518	301	217
	ACTUATOR, ELECT	VE	8312	2108	4321	2113	N	1256	5	2199	1261	938
	ACTUATOR, ELECT	VE	1134	1163	2166	2077	N	29	279	397	308	89
	ACTUATOR, ELECT	٧E	1134	1163	2166	2073	N	29	275	397	304	93
273	CIRCUIT CARD AS	٧E	2120	2156	4247	2167	N	36	11	857	47	810
274	CIRCUIT CARD AS	٧E	2120	2156	4096	2162	N	36	6	706	42	664
275	CIRCUIT CARD AS	VE	2120	2156	3247	2162	N	36	6	492	42	450
276	CIRCUIT CARD AS	VE	2120	2156	3247	2163	N	36	7	492	43	449
277	CIRCUIT CARD AS	VE	2097	2134	3347	2149	N	37	15	615	52	563
278	CIRCUIT CARD AS	VE	2097	2134	3347	2149	N	37	15	615	52	563
279	CIRCUIT CARD AS	VE	2097	2134	3130	2163	N	37	29	398	66	332
280	CIRCUIT CARD AS	٧E	2097	2134	5103	2148	N	37	14	1101	51	1050
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2064	2099	3095	2140	N	35	41	396	76	320
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2064	2099	3312	2142		35	43	613	78	535
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2014	2034	3338	2062	N	20	28	689	48	641
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		1225	1266	2264	2041	N	41	140	404	181	223
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		1225	1266	4175	2045		41		1045	185	860
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		227	284	1281	2017		57	463	419	520	-101
	CONTROL, UNIT-6		2120	2156	4247	2163		36	7	857	43	814
	CRT ASSY	VE	1092	1112	2265	2022	N	20		538	295	243
	FRONT PANEL ASS		1225	1266	2264	2065	N	41		404	205	199
	INPUT-OUTPUT	VE	2097	2134	3316	2156		37		584	59	525
	PRESSURE VESSEL	VE	1326	1350	4229	2080		24	95	998	119	879
	PROTECTION AND	VE	2064	2099	3095	2108		35	9	396	44	352
	MESSAGE UNIT, V		245	284	2285	2010		39		770		275
	ACTUATOR, ELECT	BA	2060	2092	2193	2120		32		133	60	73
	ACTUATOR, ELECT		324	1032	2088	2043		73		494	449	45 712
	BLANKER, INTERF		2004	2050	3047	2100		46	50	408	96	312
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2060	2099	3095	2108		39	9	400	48	352
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		1294	2035	3031	2153		106	118	467	224	243
	CIRCUIT CARD AS CIRCUIT CARD AS		1071	1291	2292	2043		220	117	586	337	249
			1160	1238	2243			78 220		448 504	239	209
301	TRANSMITTER, AN	BA	1071	1291	2292	2112	۲	220	186	586	406	180

	;	REPAT	r and re	PLACE DA	ATA FNI	FMS F	-16					
	'	1100		, C110C W				Cust	H-coded	Cust	Cust	Diff
			Shipped	P	roj.	Shipped	1	to	till	till	till	btwn
	Nomenclature		to USAF		Ship	to		H-code		proj	actual	proj &
line		Count		H-coded		Cust	Pro			ship	ship	actual
			• ,					7		p		
302	TRANSMITTER, AN	BA	1272	1325	2323	2101	ρ	53	141	416	194	222
	CONVERTER, PRES		1303	1340	2337	2015	ρ	37	40	399	77	322
	CONVERTER, PRES		1303	1340	2337	2015	P	37	40	399	77	322
	CONVERTER, PRES		1260	1295	2300	2015	P	35	85	405	120	285
306	CONVERTER, PRES	BE	1260	1295	2300	2015	ρ	35	85	405	120	285
	CONVERTER, PRES		1260	1295	2300	2015	ρ	35	85	405	120	285
	CONVERTER, PRES		1238	1290	2299	2015	ρ	52	90	426	142	284
	CONVERTER, PRES		1238	1284	2291	2015	ρ	46	96	418	142	276
	CONVERTER, PRES		2108	2135	3131	2150	P	27	15	388	42	346
	CONVERTER, PRES	BE	2108	2135	3131	2150	ρ	27	15	388	42	346
	CONVERTER, PRES		2063	2113	3110	2121	ρ	50	8	412	58	354
313	DETECTOR, PEAK	BE	1303	1340	2337	1360	ρ	37	20	399	57	342
314	DETECTOR, PEAK	BE	1256	1295	2300	1360	ρ	39	65	409	104	305
315	DETECTOR, PEAK	BE	1256	1295	2300	1360	ρ	39	65	409	104	305
316	DETECTOR, PEAK	BE	2015	2064	3060	2084	ρ	49	20	410	69	341
317	DIGIBUS INTERFA	BE	2086	2121	3117	2128	ρ	35	7	396	42	354
318	MULTIPLIER ASSY	₽E	2008	2050	3046	2107	P	42	57	403	99	304
319	PHASE LOCK LOOP	BE	2098	2155	3151	2169	ρ	57	14	418	71	347
320	PHASE LOCK LOOP	BE	2044	2084	3081	2128	ρ	40	44	402	84	318
321	PHASE LOCK LOOP	BE	2037	2078	3075	2169	ρ	41	91	403	132	271
322	PRESSURE VESSEL	BE	1330	1364	2361	2150	P	34	151	396	185	211
323	PRESSURE VESSEL	βE	1296	1340	2337	2150	ρ	44	175	406	219	187
324	PRESSURE VESSEL	ÐE	1296	1340	2337	2150	ρ	44	175	406	219	187
325	PRESSURE VESSEL	BE	1303	1340	2337	2118	ρ	37	143	399	180	219
326	PRESSURE VESSEL	BE	1303	1340	2337	2111	ρ	37	136	399	173	226
327	PRESSURE VESSEL	8E	1255	1294	2300	2111	P	39	182	410	221	189
328	PRESSURE VESSEL	BE	1255	1294	2300	2101	P	39	172	410	211	199
329	PRESSURE VESSEL	BE	1255	1294	2300	2101	ρ	39	172	410	211	199
330	PRESSURE VESSEL	BE	1255	1294	2300	2104	P	39	175	410	214	196
331	PRESSURE VESSEL	BE	1255	1294	2300	2104	P	39	175	410	214	196
332	PRESSURE VESSEL	BE	1255	1294	2300	2080	ρ	39	151	410	190	220
	PRESSURE VESSEL		1221	1275	2278	2078	P	54	168	422	222	200
	PRESSURE VESSEL		1221	1275	2278			54		422	221	201
	PRESSURE VESSEL		1221	1275	2278	2057	P	54	147	422	201	221
336	PRESSURE VESSEL	BE	1210	1275	2278			<b>გ</b> 5		433	227	206
337	PRESSURE VESSEL	BE	1156	1275	2278	2045	ρ	119	135	487	254	233
338	PRESSURE VESSEL	BE	1219	1275	2278	2045	P	56	135	424	191	233
	PRESSURE VESSEL		1219	1275	2278			56	134	424	190	234
	PRESSURE VESSEL		1226	1266	2269			40		408	173	235
	PRESSURE VESSEL		1177	1226	2229			49		417	184	233
	PRESSURE VESSEL		1011	1121	2119			110		473	389	84
	PRESSURE VESSEL		274	2013	3011	2167		469		832	623	209
344	PRESSURE VESSEL	BE	175	2009	3006	2150	P	564	141	926	705	221

REPAIR AND REPLACE DATA FOR FMS F-16

								Cust	H-coded	Cust	Cust	Diff
			Shipped		Proj.	Shipped	i	to	till	till	till	btwn
	Nomenclature		to USAF		Ship	ta	_	H-code	ship	proj	actual	proj &
line		Count	ry	H-coded	date	Cust	Pro	g		ship	ship	actual
7.45	RECEIVER ASSY	BE	1330	2002	2364	2007	P	37	5	399	42	757
	RECEIVER ASSY	BE	1330	2002	2364	2007	P	37 37	5	399	42 42	357 357
	RECEIVER ASSY	BE	1330	2002	2364	2007	p	37 37	5	399	42	357 357
	RECEIVER ASSY	BE	1330	2002	2364	2007	P	37	5	399	42	357 357
	RECEIVER ASSY	BE	2009	2050	3046	2055	P	41	5	402	46	356
	RECEIVER ASSY	BE	2009	2050	3046	2055	P	41	5	402	46	356
	RECEIVER ASSY	BE	2009	2050	3046	2055	ρ	41	5	402	46	356
	RECEIVER ASSY	BE	253	2008	3004	2015	ρ	485	7	846	492	354
353	REFERENCE SOURCE	BE	2107	2155	3151	2168	P	48	13	409	61	348
354	REFERENCE SOURCE	BE	2107	2155	3151	2168	P	48	13	409	61	348
	REFERENCE SOURCE		2024	2072	3048	2091	P	48	19	409	67	342
356	TRANSDUCER, MOT	. BE	2085	2126	2127	2129	Ρ	41	3	42	44	-2
	TRANSDUCER, MOT		2085	2126	3122	2170	P	41	44	402	85	317
	TRANSDUCER, MOT		2085	2121	2122	2126	P	36	5	37	41	-4
	MULTIPLIER ASSY		2015	2037	3034	2097	P	22	60	384	82	302
	ACTUATOR INSTAL		240	1011	1016	2041	P	136	395	141	531	-390
	ACTUATOR, ELECT		1230	1322	2323	2087	P	92		458	222	236
	ACTUATOR, ELECT		1232	1322	2323	2059	P	90		456	192	264
	ACTUATOR, ELECT		1231	1301	2299	2156	P	70		433	290	143
	ACTUATOR, ELECT		241	1024	2021	2024	P	148	365	510	513	-3 750
	ACTUATOR, ELECT		2104 2049	2148 2107	3144	2157	P	44 58		405	53	352
	ACTUATOR, ELECT		1230	1295	3103 2293	2122 2070		55 65		419 428	73 205	346 223
	ACTUATOR, ELECT		1230	1275	2273	20/5	P	64		427	199	223 228
	ACTUATOR, ELECT		1183	1266	2269	2053	P	83		451	235	216
	ACTUATOR, ELECT		1163	1266	2269	2017		103		471	219	252
	ACTUATOR, ELECT		1139	1248	2245	2044		109		471	270	201
	ACTUATOR, ELECT		1153	1246	2249	2044	P	93		461	256	205
	ACTUATOR, ELECT		1072	1176	2179	2065	P	104		472	358	114
	ACTUATOR, ELECT		297	1043	2046	2050		111		479	483	-4
375	ACTUATOR, ELECT	r EG	274	1011	2011	2051	ρ	102		467	507	-40
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2077	2135	2137	2143	P	58	8	60	66	-6
377	CIRCUIT CARD AS	6 EG	2077	2135	3132	2153	P	58	18	420	76	344
378	CIRCUIT CARD AS	EG E	2055	2113	3110	2163	P	58	50	420	108	312
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2055	2113	3110	2163	P	58	50	420	108	312
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2040	2113	3110			73		435	81	354
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2039	2113	3110			74		436	94	342
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2042	2113	3110	2129		71	16	433	87	346
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2004	2070	3066	2077		66		427	73	354
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2055	2113	3110	2163		58		420	108	312
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2055	2113	3110			58		420	108	312
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		1336	2041	3037	2045		70		431	74	357
79/	CIRCUIT CARD AS	6 E6	1329	2041	3037	2077	P	77	36	438	113	325

REPAIR AND REPLACE DATA FOR FMS F-16

			<b>.</b>					Cust	H-coded	Cust	Cust	Diff
	Nanaa lahuun		Shipped		Proj.	Shipper	1	to	till	till	till	btwn
1100	Nomenclature		to USAF		Ship	to		H-code	ship	proj	actual	bro1 §
line	•	Countr	у	H-coded	date	Cust	Pro	g		ship	ship	actual
388	CIRCUIT CARD AS	<b>E</b> 6	1294	2028	3024	2042	р	99	14	460	113	747
	CIRCUIT CARD AS	£6	1299	2027	3023	2042	þ	93	15	454	108	347 346
	CIRCUIT CARD AS	E6	1310	2027	3023	2127	P	82	100	443	182	261
	CIRCUIT CARD AS	EG	1310	2013	3009	2057	P	68	44	429	112	317
	CIRCUIT CARD AS	E6	1310	2013	3009	2112	P	- 68	99	429	167	262
393	CIRCUIT CARD AS	EG	1126	1210	2208	2045	p	84	200	447	284	163
394	CIRCUIT CARD AS	<b>E6</b>	1040	1122	2125	2017	P	82	260	450	342	108
395	CIRCUIT CARD AS	E6	1003	1098	2119	2017	P	95	284	481	379	102
396	COMPUTER, AIR D	E6	1335	2041	3037	2052	P	71	11	432	82	350
397	CRT ASSY	<b>E6</b>	252	1254	2260	2037	Ρ	367	148	738	515	223
	ELECTRONIC COMP	E6	1328	2041	3037	2066	Ρ	78	25	439	103	336
	ELECTRONIC COMP	63	1299	2027	3023	2038	Ρ	93	11	454	104	350
	EPROM BOARD	E6	1286	2027	3023	2038	P	106	11	467	117	350
	FIN, VENTRAL AS	E6	2006	2065	3061	2125	P	59	60	420	119	301
	PANEL ASSY	EG	1230	1294	2291	2001	P	64	72	426	136	290
	PANEL ASSY, FLI	EG	2034	2097	3093	2112	P	63	15	424	78	346
	PANEL ASSY, FLI	EG	1308	2036	3032	2112	P	93	76	454	169	285
	PANEL ASSY, FLI	EG	1231	1301	2300	2339	ρ	70	403	434	473	-39
	PANEL, INDICATI	E6	1294	2027	3023	2031	P	98	4	459	102	357
	PHASE LOCK LOOP	£6	1286	2027	3023	2042	P	106	15	467	121	346
	PLATFORM ELECTR	EG	2039	2113	3110	2127	P	74	14	436	88	348
	PLATFORM ELECTR	EG	1294	2027	3023	2042	P	98	15	459	113	346
	PLATFORM ELECTR	£6	1299	2027	3023	2038	P	93	11	454	104	350
	POWER SUPPLY	69	2070	2132	3129	2143	P	62	11	424	73	351
	POWER SUPPLY	EG	2041	2097	2159	2105	P	56	8	118	64	54
	POWER SUPPLY	E6	2040	2097	2159	2105	P	57	8	119	65	54
	POWER SUPPLY POWER SUPPLY S-	EG	1049	1172	1272	2038	P	123	231	223	354	-131
	POWER SUPPLY S-	E6 E6	2040	2113	3110	2127	Р	73	14	435	87	348
	RECEIVER ASSY	E6	1293 2041	2027 2097	3023	2101	P	99	74	460	173	287
	RECEIVER ASSY	EG	1286	2077	3093	2106	P	56	9	417	65	352
	RECEIVER ASSY	E6	1286	2027	3023 3023	2031	b	106	4	467	110	357
	RECEIVER ASSY	E6	1285	2027	3023	2031	P	106	4	467	110	357
	REFERENCE SOURC	E6	2067	2132		2031	P	107	4	468	111	357
	REFERENCE SOURC	E6	2039	2113	3129 3110	2143 2121	P	65 74	11	427	76 ~	351
	REFERENCE SOURC	E6	1343	2070	3066	2091	P	7 <b>4</b> 92	8	436	82	354
	REFERENCE SOURC	E6	1286	2027	3023	2031	P	106	21	453	113	340
	REFERENCE SOURC	E6	1286	2027	3023	2031	P	106	4	467	110	357 757
	TANK, FUEL, AIR	E6	297	1056	2059	1360	P	124	4 304	467 492	110 <b>42</b> 8	357
	TRANSMITTER, AN	E6	2034	2097	3093	2105	p	63	8	424	42 <del>8</del> 71	64 353
	TRANSMITTER, AN	£6	2012	2070	2071		P	58	3	59	61	-2
	TUBE UNIT ASSY	66	2001	2070	3066		P	69	28	430	97	222 -5
	TUBE UNIT ASSY	EG	1307	2013	3009	2016		71	3	432	74	358
						-414	•	, •	•	702	77	300

REPAIR AND REPLACE DATA FOR FMS F-16

								Cust	H-coded	Cust	Cust	Diff
			Shipped	F	roj.	Shipped	į	to	till	till	till	btwn
	Nomenclature		to USAF		Ship	to		H-code	ship	proj	actual	proj 🌡
line	1	Countr	'y	H-coded	date	Cust	Pro	9		ship	ship	actual
431		CD	2027	2057	7056	2015		74		707	40	766
	ACTUATOR, ELECT	Gr Gr	2023	2057	3055	2065	P	34	8	397	42	355 347
	CARD ASSEMBLY,	GR	1179 1115	2128	3128	2150	P P	314	22	679	336	343
	CARD ASSEMBLY.	GR	1039	1140	2138	2018	P	25 28	243	388	268	120 49
	COMPENSATOR	GR	2016	1067 2036	2067 3033	2018 2043	P	20	316 7	393 382	344 27	355
	COMPENSATOR	6R	1296	1331	2332	2043		20 35	77	401	112	289
	ELECTRONIC COMP	GR	1092	1130	2130	2051	P	38	286	403	324	79
	MEMORY, MAGNETI	6R	1234	1268	2270	2115	P	34	212	401	246	155
	MEMORY, MAGNETI		1177	1210	2208	2079	P	33	234	396	267	129
	MEMORY, MAGNETI		1133	1163	2161	2079	P	30	281	393	311	82
	MEMORY, MAGNETI	GR	306	351	1349	2079	P	45	458	408	503	- <del>9</del> 5
	POWER SUPPLY	GR	1039	1095	2101	2114	P	56	384	427	440	-13
	TRANSMITTER, AN		2077	2104	2106	2107	P	27	3	29	30	-1
	TUBE UNIT ASSY	6R	2049	2078	3075	2092	P	29	14	391	43	348
	TUBE UNIT ASSY	GR	2049	2078	3075	2092	P	29	14	391	43	348
	INERTIAL NAVIGA		1326	2034	3032	2042	P	73	8	436	81	355
447		KS	2027	2097	2101	2101	P	70	4	74	74	0
448	ACTUATOR INSTAL	KS	47	110	1107	2039	P	63	659	425	722	-297
449	ACTUATOR INSTAL		47	108	1105	2025	ρ	61	647	423	708	-285
450	ACTUATOR, ELECT	KS	1281	1345	2342	2070	Ρ	64	90	426	154	272
	ACTUATOR, ELECT		1239	1289	2286	2065	ρ	50	141	412	191	221
	ACTUATOR, ELECT		1239	1287	2285	2017	P	48	95	411	143	268
453	ACTUATOR, ELECT	KS	1220	1284	2281	2086	P	64	167	426	231	195
	ACTUATOR, ELECT		47	1182	2179	2065	P	500	248	862	748	114
455	ACTUATOR, ELECT	KS	326	1043	2040	2050	P	82	372	444	454	-10
456	ACTUATOR, ELECT	KS	296	324	1321	2050	P	28	456	390	484	-94
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2055	2113	3113	2142	P	58	29	423	87	336
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2027	2097	2101	2101	P	70	4	74	74	0
	CIRCUIT CARD AS	_	2027	2093	3090	2147	P	66	54	428	120	308
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2027	2093	3090	2108		66	15	428	81	347
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2027	2093	3090	2120		66	27	428	93	335
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2027	2093	3090	2108		66	15	428	81	347
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2027	2092	2094	2098		65	6	67	71	-4
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2027	2078	3075	2119		51	41	413	92	321
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		1253	1353	2350			100		462	150	312
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		1253	1345	2343	2017		92	37	455	129	326
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		1253	1345	2343		P	92		455	213	242
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		267	1309	2308	2013		407	69	771	476	295
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		1120	1171	2171	2045		51	239	416	290	126
	ELECTRONIC COMP		2048	2114	2119	2121	P	66	7	71	73	-2
	NOISE REGULATOR		2037	2078	3075	2086		41	8	403	49	354
	NOISE REGULATOR	-	1253	1354	2351	2022		101	33	463		329
4/5	POWER SUPPLY	KS	2048	2114	2119	2121	P	66	7	71	73	-2

# REPAIR AND REPLACE DATA FOR FMS F-16

								Cust	H-coded	Cust	Cust	Diff
			Shipped		Proj.	Shipper	į	to	till	till	till	btwn
	Nomenclature		to USAF		Ship	to		H-code	ship	proj	actual	proj &
line	1	Count	гу	H-coded	date	Cust	Pro	g		ship	ship	actual
				_								
	POWER SUPPLY	KS	2055	2114	2121	2126	P	59	12	66	71	<b>-5</b>
	POWER SUPPLY	KS	2027	2093	3090	2099	P	66	6	428	72	356
	POWER SUPPLY	KS	1268	1319	2316	2017	P	51	63	413	114	299
	POWER SUPPLY S-		1253	1345	2243	1364	Ρ	92	19	355	111	244
	RECEIVER S-ASSY		267	1309	2308	2013	P	407	69	771	476	295
	RECEIVER, RADAR		2027	2097	2101	2101	Ρ	70	4	74	74	0
	RECEIVER, RADAR		2027	2092	3089	2099	P	65	7	427	72	355
	TANK, FUEL, AIR		1259	1345	2343	1361	P	86	16	449	102	347
	TUBE UNIT ASSY	KS	2027	2093	3090	2114	₽	66	21	428	87	341
	TUBE UNIT ASSY	KS	2027	2093	3090	2114	P	66	21	428	87	341
	TUBE UNIT ASSY	KS	2027	2093	3090	2114		66	21	428	87	341
	TUBE UNIT ASSY	KS	1149	1200	2200	2142	P	51	307	416	358	58
	VALVE, REGULATI		1281	1345	2343	2038	P	64	58	427	122	305
	VIN FIN ASSY	KS	1308	2009	3009	2057	Ρ	66	48	431	114	317
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		1118	1168	2174	1361	Ρ	50	193	421	243	178
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		225	253	1251	2073	P	28	550	391	578	-187 -
	CONVERTER, PRES		2077	2113	3110	2121	P	36	8	398	44	354
491	FIN, VENTRAL	NE	1159	1284	2281	2125	P	125	206	487	331	156
492	RACK, ELECTRICA	NE	9042	9075	119	2065	P	33	1085	442	1118	-676
493	RACK, ELECTRICA	NE	1188	1231	2229	2065	P	43	199	406	242	164
494	RACK, ELECTRICA	NE	329	1011	2011	2065	P	47	419	412	466	-54
495	TRANSDUCER ASSY	NE	9232	1221	2218	2013	P	719	157	1081	876	205
496	VIN FIN ASSY	NE	2056	2091	3087	2121	ρ	35	30	396	65	331
497	WAVEGUIDE ASSY	NE	1292	1340	2350	2002	P	48	27	423	75	348
498		TH	2044	2076	3080	2115	P	32	39	401	71	330
499	ACTUATOR, ELECT	TH	1276	2022	3024	2162	P	111	140	478	251	227
500	CIRCUIT CARD AS	TH	2044	2076	3080	2108	P	32	32	401	64	337
501	CIRCUIT CARD AS	TH	2044	2076	3080	2094	P	32	18	401	50	351
502	CIRCUIT CARD AS	TH	2044	2076	3080	2112	P	32	36	401	68	333
503	CIRCUIT CARD AS	TH	2044	2076	3080	2100	P	32	24	401	56	345
504	MULTIPLEX	TH	2044	2076	3080	2128	P	32	52	401	84	317
505	PHASE SHIFTER	TH	2044	2076	3080	2143	P	32	67	401	99	302
506	SIGHT, HUD	TH	2044	2076	3080	2115	P	32	39	401	71	330
	TRANSMITTER, AN	TH	2041	2076	2106	2107	P	35	31	65	66	-1
508	VALVE, REGULATI	TH	1276	2025	3025	2050	P	114	25	479	139	340
509	•	TK	2088	2125	3121	2133		37	8	398	45	353
510		TK	2088	2121	3117	2133		33	12	394	45	349
511		TK	2058	2100	3096	2108		42	8	403	50	353
512		TK	2008	2041	3038	2082		33	41	395	74	321
513		TK	1338	2027	3024	2082		54	55	416	109	307
514		TK	2088	2136	3132	2154		48	18	409	66	343
	ACTUATOR INSTAL		9282	190	1187	2041	P	273	581	635	854	-219
	ACTUATOR, ELECT		1035	1073	2076	2106		38	398	406	436	-30
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								Cust	H-coded	Cust	Cust	Diff
			Shipped		Proj.	Shipped	1	to	till	till	till	btwn
	Nomenclature		to USAF		Ship	to		H-code	ship	proj	actual	proj 🌡
line	I	Count	ry	H-coded	date	Cust	Pro	9		ship	ship	actual
	ACTUATOR, ELECT		1188	1224	2228	2080	P	36	221	405	257	148
	ACTUATOR, ELECT		1064	1102	2108	2052	P	38	315	409	353	56
	ACTUATOR, ELECT		1064	1098	2107	2051	₽	34	318	408	352	56
	ACTUATOR, ELECT		347	1060	2057	2164	P	78	469	440	547	-107
	ACTUATOR, ELECT		239	304	1301	2051	P	65	477	427	542	-115
	ACTUATOR, ELECT		239	<b>28</b> 8	1280	2052	P	49	494	406	543	-137
	ACTUATOR, ELECT		1245	1296	2294	2017	P	51	86	414	137	277
	ACTUATOR, ELECT		1245	1289	2287	2069	P	44		407	189	218
	ACTUATOR, ELECT		1151	1203	2200	2070	P	52		414	284	130
	ACTUATOR, ELECT		2088	2135	3131	2149	P	47		408	61	347
	ANTENNA	TK	1188	1225	2074	2050	P	37	190	251	227	24
	ANTENNA	TK	1151	1182	2186	2050	ρ	31	233	400	264	136
	BACKPLANE ASSY	TK	2088	2125	3121	2128	P	37	3	398	40	358
	BLANKER, INTERF		1338	2009	3006	2100	P	36		398	127	271
	BLANKER, INTERF		1338	2009	3006	2038	P	36		398	65	333
	CARD ASSEMBLY,	TK	1064	1098	2107	2133	P	34		408	- 434	-26
	CARD ASSEMBLY,	TK	347	1039	2042	2133		57		425	516	-91
	CENTRAL PROCESS		2008	2085	3081	2140	P	77		438	132	306
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2088	2125	3121	2133		37		398	45	353
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2058	2122	2143	2154		64		85	96	-11
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2088	2121	3117	2133		33		394	45	349
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2058	2092	3088	2097		34		395	39	356
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2029	2071	3067	2091	P	42		403	62	341
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2029	2071	3067	2084		42		403	55	348
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2029	2071	3067	2112		42	_	403		320
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2008	2057	2059	2062	P	49	_	51	54	-3
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2008	2057	3054	2066	P	49		411	58	353
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2008	2041	3038	2084		33		395	76	319
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2008	2041	3038	2125	P	22		395	117	278
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2008	2041	3038	2051	P	33		395	43	352
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		1338	2027	3024	2112	P	54		416	139	277
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		1338	2027	3024	2031	P	54	4	416	58	358
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		1338	2027	3024	2084	ρ	54		416	111	305
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		1338	2027	3024		P	54		416		358
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		1338	2027	3024			54		416		358
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		1304	2015	3011	2051		76		437		325
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		1338	2009	3006	2016		36		398		355
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		1304	1358	2364	2087		54		425	148	277
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		1304	1358	2364	2031		54		425	92	333
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		1304	1358	2364	2082		54		425	143	282
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		1304	1358	2364	2007		54		425		357
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		1304	1358	2364	2008		54		425	69	356
559	CIRCUIT CARD AS	TK	1304	1358	2364	2016	P	54	23	425	77	348

REPAIR AND REPLACE DATA FOR FMS F-16

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			Shipped		Proj.	Shipper	d	to	till	till	till	btwn
	Nomenclature	_	to USAF		Ship	to		H-code	ship	proj	actual	proj 🌡
line	į.	Countr	'y	H-coded	date	Cust	Pro	9		ship	ship	actual
540	CIRCUIT CARD AS	TK	307	1347	2347	2017	P	405	35	770	440	330
	CIRCUIT CARD AS	TK	307	1347	2347	2121	P	405	139	770	440 544	226
	CIRCUIT CARD AS	TK	307	1338	2336	2084	P	396	111	770 759	507	252
	CIRCUIT CARD AS	TK	307	1338	2336	1353	þ	396	15	759	411	348
	CIRCUIT CARD AS	TK	307	1338	2336	2028	P	396	55	759	451	308
	CIRCUIT CARD AS	TK	307	1338	1340	1364	P	396	26	398	422	-24
	CIRCUIT CARD AS	TK	1211	1246	2252	2050	P	35	169	406	204	202
	CIRCUIT CARD AS	TK	1188	1224	2228	2050	ρ	36	191	405	227	178
568	CIRCUIT CARD AS	TK	1188	1224	1365	2105	P	36	246	177	282	-105
569	CIRCUIT CARD AS	TK	1085	1130	2133	1354	P	45	224	413	269	144
	CIRCUIT CARD AS	TK	1035	1106	2103	1354	P	71	248	433	319	114
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2120	2155	3151	2162	ρ	35	7	396	42	354
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2088	2135	3131	2154	P	47	19	408	66	342
	COMPENSATOR	TK	205	2021	3018	2045	P	546	24	908	570	228
	COMPUTER, FIRE	TK	1338	2066	3062	2080	P	93		454	107	347
	CONTROL S-ASSY	TK	1188	1224	2228	2094	ρ	36	235	405	271	134
	CONVERTER, PRES		1304	1358	2364	2015	P	54	22	425	76	349
	CONVERTER, PRES		1188	1225	2074	2022	P	37	162	251	199	52
	CONVERTER, PRES		2120	2155	2156	2164	P	35	9	36	44	-8 247
	CONVERTER, SIGN CYLINDER ASSY,	TK TK	1211 1338	1283 2030	2280	2017		72	99	434	171	263
	Core Memory Uni	TK	2088	2135	3037 3131	2044	P	57 47	14	429	71	358
	Core Memory Uni	TK	1304	2015	3011	2148 2021	P	76	13 6	408 437	60 82	348 355
	ELECTRONIC COMP	TK	1151	1182	2186	2006	P	31	189	400	220	180
	ELECTRONIC COMP	TK	2058	2105	3102	2112	P	47	7	409	54	355
	ELECTRONIC COMP	TK	1338	2027	3024	2041	þ	54	14	416	68	348
	ELECTRONIC COMP	TK	1338	2027	3024	2036	, P	54	9	416	63	353
	ELECTRONIC COMP	TK	1304	2015	2016	2021	P	76	6	77	82	<b>-</b> 5
	ELECTRONIC COMP	TK	307	1338	2336	1353	P	396	15	759	411	348
	PANEL, INDICATI	TK	1304	1358	2364	2010	P	54	17	425	71	354
	PANEL, POWERDIS		2008	2041	3038	2097	P	33	56	395	89	306
591	PANEL, POWERDIS	TK	307	1338	2336	2097	ρ	396	124	759	520	239
592	PANEL, POWERDIS	TK	1151	1182	2186	2157	P	31	340	400	371	29
593	PANEL, POWERDIS	TK	9220	9255	258	2097	ρ	35	937	403	972	-569
594	PANEL, POWERDIS	TK	2120	2155	3151	2163	P	35	8	396	43	353
595	POWER SUPPLY	TK	2088	2121	3117	2157	P	33	36	394	69	325
	POMER SUPPLY	TK	2029	2085	3081	2094	P	56	9	417	65	352
	POMER SUPPLY	TK	2029	2071	3067	2082		42		403	53	350
	POWER SUPPLY	TK	2008	2041	2043	2051		33	10	35	43	-8
	POWER SUPPLY	TK	1338	2036	3032	2094		63	58	424	121	303
	POWER SUPPLY	TK	1338	2027	3024	2031	P	54	4	416	58	328
	POWER SUPPLY	TK	1304	1358	2364	2136		54	143	425	197	228
602	POMER SUPPLY	TK	307	1347	2347	2021	P	405	39	770	444	326

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								Cust	H-coded	Cust	Cust	Diff
			Shipped		Proj.	Shippe	đ	to	till	till	till	btwn
	Nomenclature		to USAF		Ship	to		H-code	ship	proj	actual	proj &
line	1	Count	ГУ	H-coded	date	Cust	Pro	g		ship	ship	actual
							_		_	_		
	POWER SUPPLY	TK	2120	2155	2156	2164		35	9	36	44	-8
	PRESSURIZING SE	TK	2058	2086	3082	2101	P	28	15	389	43	346
	PRESSURIZING SE		1338	2030	3037	2087	P	57		429	114	315
	PRINTED CIRCUIT		2058	2090	3086	2094	P	32		393	36	357
	PRINTED CIRCUIT		1304	1358	2064	2014		54		125	75	50
	PROCESSOR, SIGN		2029	2085	3081	2094	P	56	9	417	65	352
	RECEIVER, RADAR		2029	2071	3067	2078	P	42		403	49	354
	SENSOR, PNEUMAT		2008	2041	3038	2062		33		395	54	341
	TANK, FUEL, AIR		1304	2006	3003	2079	P	67		429	140	289
	TANK, FUEL, AIR		1245	1340	2340	1361	P	95	21	460	116	344
	TRANSDUCER ASSY		1304	1358	2364	2013		54		425	74	351
	TRANSDUCER ASSY		307	1338	2336	2016		396	43	759	439	320
	TRANSDUCER ASSY		1085	1130	2133	2013		45		413	293	120
	TRANSMITTER S-A		2029	2072	2073	2080	P	43		44	51	-7
	TRANSMITTER S-A		1338	2036	2037	2045		63		64	72	-8
	TRANSPARENCEY,	TK	2008	2041	3038	2072		33		395	64	331
	TRANSPARENCY, C		1304	1357	2356	2016		53		417	77	340
	TRANSPARENCY, C		307	1338	2036	1353		396		459	411	48
	TUBE UNIT ASSY	TK	2088	2125	3121	2139		37		398	51	347
	TUBE UNIT ASSY	TK	2058	2090	3086	2107		32		393	49	344
	TUBE UNIT ASSY	TK	1338	2009	3006			36		398	43	355
	TUBE UNIT ASSY	TK	1151	1182	2186	2017		31		400	231	169
	TUBE UNIT ASSY	TK	2120	2155	3151	2164		35		396		352
	UNIT, RATE SENS		2008	2041	3038	2065		22		395	57	228
	VALVE, REGULATI		1304	1358	2364			54		425		307
	VALVE, SOLENOID		2029	2074	2075	2078		45		46	49	-3
	VALVE, SOLENOID		1304	1364	2003			60		64	67	-3
	VIDEO INTERFACE		307	1347	2347			405		770		220
	VIN FIN ASSY	TK	1338	2009	3006			36		398	107	<b>29</b> 1
	VIN FIN ASSY	TK	1304	1358	2364	2045		54		425	106	319
	ACTUATOR, ELECT		2076	2113	3110		P	37	8	399	45	354
	ACTUATOR, ELECT		8312	2108	3104	2112	P	1256	4	1617	1260	<b>3</b> 57
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2076	2126	3122			50		411	64	347
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2076	2126	3122			50		411	64	347
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2076	2113	3110			37		399		335
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2076	2113	3110			37		399		322
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2061	2099	3095			38		399		320
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2014	2034	3030			20		381	42	339
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		2014	2034	3030			20		381	142	239
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		1304	1331	2333			27		394		232
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		1134	1163	2166			29		397		114
	CIRCUIT CARD AS		1084	1115	2118			31		399		-30
645	CONVERTER, POME	VE	2076	2113	3110	2140	P	37	27	399	64	335

REPAIR AND REPLACE DATA FOR FNS F-16

	Nomenclature		Shipped to USAF		Proj. Ship	Shipped to	i	Cust to H-code	H-coded till ship	Cust till proj	Cust till actual	Diff btwn proj &
line		Count	гу	H-coded	date	Cust	Pro			ship	ship	actual
	POWER AMPLIFIER	_	2076	2113	3110	2119	P	37	6	399	43	356
647	POWER SUPPLY S-	· VE	2076	2113	3110	2140	P	37	27	399	64	335
648	RADIO FREQUENCY	VE	2014	2034	3030	2142	P	20	108	381	128	253
649	RADIO FREQUENCY	<b>VE</b>	2014	2034	3030	2142	ρ	20	108	381	128	253
650	RECEIVER ASSY	VE	2014	2034	3030	2051	P	20	17	381	37	344
651	RECEIVER ASSY	VE	1304	1331	2333	2002	P	27	36	394	63	331
652	REFERENCE SOURCE	VE	2064	2099	3095	2108	P	35	9	396	44	352
653	REFERENCE SOURCE	VE	2064	2099	3101	2114	P	35	15	402	50	352
654	TRANSMITTER S-A	VE	65	108	1110	2016	P	43	638	410	681	-271
655	TRANSMITTER, AN	VE	2097	2134	3130	2153	P	37	19	398	56	342
656	CONVERTER, PRES	BE	1312	1350	2347	2015	P	38	30	400	68	332

## APPENDIX D: STATISTIX OUTPUTS FOR TOTAL DATA SET


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
HCODE	Number of days from customer initiated
	requisition until requisition is H-coded
PHCODE	Same as HCODE but for programmed
	requisitions only
NHCODE	Same as HCODE but for non-programmed
	requisitions only
SHIP	Number of days from H-coding until shipped
	from the TRC
PSHIP	Same as SHIP but for programmed
	requisitions only
NSHIP	Same as SHIP but for non-programmed
	requisitions only
TOTAL	Total number of days from customer
	initiation until shipped from TRC
PTOTAL	Same as TOTAL but for programmed
	requisitions only
NTOTAL	Same as TOTAL but for non-programmed
	requisitions only
DIFF	Number of days difference between USAF's
	first projected ship date and actual ship
	date
PDIFF	Same as DIFF but for programmed
	requisitions only
NDIFF	Same as DIFF but for non-programmed
· · <u>· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · </u>	requisitions only
	requisivions only


STATISTIX 3.5
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS


	HCODE	SHIP	TOTAL	DIFF
CASES	656	656	656	656
LOWER 90.0% C.I.	77.94	102.3	185.5	287.4
MEAN	85.80	112.1	197.9	306.0
UPPER 90.0% C.I.	93.67	121.8	210.3	324.6
S.D.	122.3	151.7	192.9	289.0
S.E. (MEAN)	4.775	5.922	7.531	11.28
C.V.	142.54	135.34	97.48	94.43
MINIMUM	5.000	2.000	25.00	-2.129E+03
MEDIAN	54.00	43.50	113.0	317.5
MAX I MUM 1	.256E+03	1.143E+03	1.261E+03	1.180E+03


#### STATISTIX 3.5














#### DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

CASES LOWER 90.0% C.I. MEAN UPPER 90.0% C.I. S.D. S.E. (MEAN) C.V. MINIMUM MEDIAN MAXIMUM	PHCODE 363 72.86 82.81 92.76 114.9 6.032 138.79 20.00 54.00 1.256E+03	NHCODE 293 76.89 89.52 102.1 131.0 7.651 146.31 5.000 59.00 1.256E+03	PSHIP 363 86.56 98.83 111.1 141.9 7.446 143.53 3.000 36.00 1.085E+03	NSHIP 293 112.9 128.5 144.1 161.8 9.451 125.93 2.000 56.00 1.143E+03
CASES LOWER 90.0% C.I. MEAN UPPER 90.0% C.I. S.D. S.E. (MEAN) C.V. MINIMUM MEDIAN MAXIMUM	PTOTAL	NTOTAL	PDIFF	NDIFF
	363	293	363	293
	166.0	203.4	220.4	358.8
	181.6	225.7	234.2	395.0
	197.3	248.1	247.9	431.3
	181.3	231.6	159.0	376.3
	9.514	13.53	8.345	21.98
	99.79	102.62	67.90	95.26
	27.00	25.00	-676.0	-2.129E+03
	108.0	146.0	307.0	336.0
	1.260E+03	2.162E+03	358.0	1.180E+03


#### STATISTIX 3.5








#### STATISTIX 3.5





STATISTIX 3.5

### TWO SAMPLE T TESTS FOR PHOODE VS NHOODE

			SAMPLE	<b>:</b>		
VARIAB	LE 	MEAN	SIZE	s.D		S.E.
PHCODE NHCODE		2.81 7.52	363 293	114.9 131.0	_	.032 .651
			T 	DF	P	
	VARIANCE L VARIA		-0.70 -0.69		0.4855 0.4988	
	FOR EQUA OF VARIA		F 1.30	NUM DF  292	DEN D 362	F P  0.0092

#### STATISTIX 3.5

CASES INCLUDED 656

### WILCOXON SIGNED RANK TEST FOR PHOODE - NHOODE

SUM OF NEGATIVE RANKS SUM OF POSITIVE RANKS	-2.024E+04 1.882E+04
NORMAL APPROXIMATION WITH CONTINUITY CORRECTION TWO TAILED P VALUE FOR NORMAL APPROXIMATION	0.529 0.5971
TOTAL NUMBER OF VALUES WHICH WERE TIED 224 NUMBER OF ZERO DIFFERENCES DROPPED 14 MAX. DIFF. ALLOWED BETWEEN TIES 1.0E-0005	

CASES INCLUDED 279

STATISTIX 3.5

### TWO SAMPLE T TESTS FOR PSHIP VS NSHIP

		SAMPLE	Ē			
VARIABLE	MEAN	SIZE	S.D.	S	.E.	
PSHIP	98.83	363	141.9		7.446	
NSHIP	128.5	293	161.8	9.4	51	
		T	DF	Ρ		
EQUAL VARIA	ANCES	-2.50	654 0	.0128		
UNEQUAL VARIANCES -2.46 585.1 0.0135						
		F	NUM DF	DEN DF	· Р	
TESTS FOR E	EQUALITY					
OF VA	ARIANCES	1.30	292	362	0.0089	
CASES INCLU	JDED 656					

### STATISTIX 3.5

### WILCOXON SIGNED RANK TEST FOR PSHIP - NSHIP

SUM OF NEGATIVE RANKS	-2.332E+04
SUM OF POSITIVE RANKS	1.945E+04
NORMAL APPROXIMATION WITH CONTINUITY CORRECTION	1.339
TWO TAILED P VALUE FOR NORMAL APPROXIMATION	0.1805

TOTAL NUMBER OF VALUES WHICH WERE TIED 183
NUMBER OF ZERO DIFFERENCES DROPPED 1
MAX. DIFF. ALLOWED BETWEEN TIES 1.0E-0005

CASES INCLUDED 292

## APPENDIX E: STATISTIX OUTPUTS FOR REDUCED DATA SET

### (90% OF TOTAL DATA SET)


### Legend

HCODE	Number of days from customer initiated
	requisition until requisition is H-coded
PHCODE	Same as HCODE but for programmed
	requisitions only
NHCODE	Same as HCODE but for non-programmed
	requisitions only
SHIP	Number of days from H-coding until shipped
	from the TRC
PSHIP	Same as SHIP but for programmed
	requisitions only
NSHIP	Same as SHIP but for non-programmed
	requisitions only
TOTAL	Total number of days from customer
	initiation until shipped from TRC
PTOTAL	Same as TOTAL but for programmed
	requisitions only
NTOTAL	Same as TOTAL but for non-programmed
	requisitions only
DIFF	Number of days difference between USAF's
	first projected ship date and actual ship
	date
PDIFF	Same as DIFF but for programmed
	requisitions only
NDIFF	Same as DIFF but for non-programmed
	equisitions only

	HCODE	SHIP	TOTAL	DIFF
CASES	593	590	590	590
LOWER 90.0% C.I.	53.54	66.29	140.4	285.3
MEAN	55.04	71.53	147.7	299.1
UPPER 90.0% C.I.	56.54	76.77	155.1	312.8
S.D.	22.17	77.27	108.9	202.7
S.E. (MEAN)	9.103E-01	3.181	4.484	8.344
C.V.	40.28	108.03	73.72	67.77
MINIMUM	5.000	2.000	25.00	-42.00
MEDIAN	54.00	36.00	104.5	317.5
MAXIMUM	117.0	307.0	463.0	874.0


STATISTIX 3.5
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

	PHCODE
CASES	326
LOWER 90.0% C.I.	50.86
MEAN	52.75
UPPER 90.0% C.I.	54.63
S.D.	20.68
S.E. (MEAN)	1.145
C.V.	39.21
MINIMUM	20.00
MEDIAN	49.00
MAXIMUM	107.0



STATISTIX 3.5
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS


	NHCODE
CASES	263
LOWER 90.0% C.I.	54.74
MEAN	57.07
UPPER 90.0% C.I.	59.41
S.D.	22.93
S.E. (MEAN)	1.414
C.V.	40.18
MINIMUM	5.000
MEDIAN	55.00
MAXIMUM	121.0




	PSHIP
CASES	325
LOWER 90.0% C.I.	53.85
MEAN	59.94
UPPER 90.0% C.I.	66.04
S.D.	66.57
S.E. (MEAN)	3.693
c.v.	111.05
MINIMUM	3.000
MEDIAN	27.00
MAXIMUM	248.0

STAT I	JENC						HIST	OGRAM	0F	PSHIP	
180	+	***									
	* *										
150	+**	***									
	<b> **</b>	***									
	•	***									
120											
	•	***									
90	+**	***									
70		***									
	•	***									
60	+**	***									
	**	****	***								
	<b>**</b>	****	***								
30	+**	****	***								
	;##	****	****	****	****	****	****			×	
0	1 **	****	·****		****	***** +-	+-	***** +-	~~~	* ++-	+
v	0	30	60	90 32	120 5 CAS	150	180 OTTED	210	24 MIS	0 270 SING CA	300 ISES

	NSHIP
CASES	263
LOWER 90.0% C.I.	76.37
MEAN	85.32
UPPER 90.0% C.I.	94.27
S.D.	87.89
S.E. (MEAN)	5.419
C.V.	103.01
MINIMUM	2.000
MEDIAN	43.00
MAXIMUM	328.0





	PTOTAL
CASES	324
LOWER 90.0% C.I.	123.1
MEAN	132.0
UPPER 90.0% C.I.	140.9
S.D.	97.45
S.E. (MEAN)	5.414
C.V.	73.83
MINIMUM	27.00
MEDIAN	93.50
MAXIMUM	439.0



STATISTIX 3.5 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

	NTOTAL
CASES	263
LOWER 90.0% C.I.	154.9
MEAN	167.2
UPPER 90.0% C.I.	179.5
S.D.	120.5
S.E. (MEAN)	7.428
C.V.	72.04
MINIMUM	25.00
MEDIAN	116.0
MAXIMUM	495.0





# STATISTIX 3.5 TWO SAMPLE T TESTS FOR PHCODE VS NHCODE

VARIABI	E MEAN	SAMPLE SIZE	5.D.	S	.E.
PHCODE NHCODE	53.00 56.49	299 236	20.90	1.2	•
		T	DF	Р	
	VARIANCES VARIANCES	-1.84 -1.82		.0658 .0652	
	FOR EQUALITY OF VARIANCES	F 1.19	NUM DF  235	DEN DF  298	P  0.0803

# STATISTIX 3.5 WILCOXON SIGNED RANK TEST FOR PHCODE - NHCODE

SUM OF NEGATIVE RANKS SUM OF POSITIVE RANKS	-1.270E+04 1.205E+04
NORMAL APPROXIMATION WITH CONTINUITY CORRECTION TWO TAILED P VALUE FOR NORMAL APPROXIMATION	0.337 0.7360
TOTAL NUMBER OF VALUES WHICH WERE TIED 202	

TOTAL NUMBER OF VALUES WHICH WERE TIED 202 NUMBER OF ZERO DIFFERENCES DROPPED 14 MAX. DIFF. ALLOWED BETWEEN TIES 1.0E-0005

STATISTIX 3.5
TWO SAMPLE T TESTS FOR PSHIP VS NSHIP


VARIA	BLE MEAN	SAMPLE SIZE	S.D.	S	.E.
PSHIP NSHIP	61.78 84.20	300 235	67.56 87.86	3.9 5.7	
		Т	DF	P	
	VARIANCES AL VARIANCES	-3.34 -3.23		.0009	
TESTS	FOR EQUALITY OF VARIANCES	F  1.69	NUM DF 	DEN DF 	P 

# STATISTIX 3.5 WILCOXON SIGNED RANK TEST FOR PSHIP - NSHIP

SUM OF NEGATIVE RANKS SUM OF POSITIVE RANKS	-1.529E+04 1.221E+04
NORMAL APPROXIMATION WITH CONTINUITY CORRECTION TWO TAILED P VALUE FOR NORMAL APPROXIMATION	1.487 0.1371
TOTAL NUMBER OF VALUES WHICH WERE TIED 167 NUMBER OF ZERO DIFFERENCES DROPPED 1 MAX. DIFF. ALLOWED BETWEEN TIES 1.0E-0005	


STATISTIX 3.5
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

	PDIFF
CASES	324
LOWER 90.0% C.I.	240.2
MEAN	251.1
UPPER 90.0% C.I.	262.0
S.D.	119.1
S.E. (MEAN)	6.617
C.V.	47.43
MINIMUM	-39.00
MEDIAN	306.5
MAXIMUM	356.0



STATISTIX 3.5
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

	NDIFF
CASES	263
LOWER 90.0% C.I.	366.1
MEAN	396.6
UPPER 90.0% C.I.	427.0
S.D.	299.3
S.E. (MEAN)	18.46
C.V.	75.47
MINIMUM	-49.00
MEDIAN	336.0
MAXIMUM	990.0



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#### Vita

Captain Lawrence M. Orlando was born on 5 August 1958 in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. He graduated from The American High School of the Hague in Scheveningen, Holland in 1976 and enlisted in the United States Air Force in 1978. first tour of duty was at Holloman AFB, New Mexico where he served as an Environmental Support Specialist in the 49th Civil Engineering Squadron. He left the USAF in 1982 and attended New Mexico State University where he joined the USAF Reserve Officer Training Corps. Upon graduation with a Bachelor of Science in Civil Engineering (specialty: Environmental Engineering) in 1986, he received a reserve commission in the USAF and went to Chanute AFB, Illinois to attend the Aircraft Maintenance Officer Course. In 1987, he began his first tour as a maintenance officer at Castle AFB, California where he served in the 93rd Organizational Maintenance Squadron and the 93rd Field Maintenance Squadron. He entered the School of Systems and Logistics, Air Force Institute of Technology, in May 1991.

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#### <u>Vita</u>

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This study examined the reparable logistics pipeline and identified characteristics and associated problems with the processing of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) repair and replace aircraft assets. Areas of investigation included examining the FMS logistics reparable pipeline and determining what section of the pipeline the USAF controls or can influence, identifying the individual problems within that section of pipeline, and collecting and analyzing data pertaining to FMS repair and replace requisitions. The methodology used in these areas involved a literature review, personal interviews with Foreign Liaison Officers to obtain customer perspectives, and a statistical analysis of pipeline times for all FMS replacement requisitions for F-16 reparables filled within a specific six month period. Of primary concern to both the USAF and the customers was the time it took to fill replacement requisitions and especially the problems associated with H-coding requisitions. The research showed numerous possible causes for delays and indicated that many of the problems start before the USAF is even aware of the customer's demand, but that the USAF has been working hard to correct problems within its control and has attempted to improve the process overall.

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